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Abstract
This paper investigates the relative wage and the relative price effects of higher
productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables in a two-sector open econ-
omy model with search unemployment. Applying cointegration methods to a panel
of eighteen OECD countries over the period 1970-2007, our estimates reveal that a 1
percentage point increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables lowers the non traded wage relative to the traded wage (relative wage) by
0.22% and appreciates the relative price of non tradables by 0.64%. While the decline
in the relative wage reveals the presence of mobility costs preventing from the wage
equalization across sectors, the relative wage responses to a productivity differential
display a large dispersion across countries, thus suggesting that labor market frictions
vary substantially across OECD economies. Using a set of indicators capturing the
heterogeneity of labor market frictions across economies, we find that the relative wage
significantly declines more in countries where labor market regulation is more pro-
nounced. These empirical findings can be rationalized in a two-sector open economy
model with search in the labor market and an endogenous labor force participation. In
line with our estimates, our quantitative analysis reveals that the relative wage falls
more in countries where unemployment benefits are more generous, firing cost is high,
the worker bargaining power is large, and/or the labor force is less responsive at the
extensive margin. When calibrating the model to each OECD economy, our numerical
results reveal that the model predicts the relative wage response fairly well, and to a
lesser extent the relative price response.
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1 Introduction
A major structural change shared by all OECD countries is technological change biased
toward the traded sector. As established by Balassa [1964] and Samuelson [1964] (BS here-
after), higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables tends to appreciate
the relative price of non tradables which in turn raises domestic prices, thus leading to the
so-called BS effect. While the positive relationship between the technological change and
the relative price of non tradables has been corroborated by a number of empirical studies,
the impact of higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables on the non traded
wage relative to the traded wage (relative wage hereafter) has so far not been explored
by the literature.1 The reason is that almost all papers analyzing the BS effect imposes
the assumption of perfect mobility of labor across sectors so that the sectoral wages must
equalize. Unlike, our evidence for 18 OECD countries show that technological change tends
to lower the relative wage of non tradables over the period 1970-2007 in all economies of our
sample, and more so in countries where the labor market regulation is more pronounced.
We show that these findings can be rationalized in a two sector open economy model with
search in the labor market.
Surprisingly enough, it is only recently that the theory developed by Balassa [1964]
and Samuelson [1964] fifty years ago has been updated, notably by Bergin et al. [2006],
Ghironi and Melitz [2005]. These two papers relax the assumption of perfectly competitive
goods market and show that heterogenous productivity among firms and/or entry and exit
of firms amplifies the effect of higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables
on domestic prices. Ghironi and Melitz [2005] show higher traded productivity triggers
firm entry which stimulates labor demand, raises wages and thus increases traded prices,
which amplifies the rise in domestic prices commonly induced by the appreciation in the
price of non traded goods. According to Bergin et al. [2006], technological change biased
toward the traded sector induces the least productive firms in the traded sector to cease
exporting; as a result, the share of non tradables in the economy increases, thus amplifying
the effect of the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables on domestic prices. In
our paper, we consider imperfectly competitive labor markets and show that labor market
frictions moderate the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables triggered by a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables by reducing the relative wage
of non tradables. In this respect, our paper can be viewed as complementary of the existing
theoretical literature related to the BS effect while it is also close to the literature exploring
the labor market outcomes of trade liberalization episodes by relaxing the assumption of
perfect labor mobility (see e.g., Kambourov [2009]).
1see e.g., De Gregorio et al. [1994], Canzoneri et al. [1999], Kakkar [2003], Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
[2002].
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To set the stage of the quantitative analysis, we first assess empirically the effects of
technological change biased toward the traded sector on both the relative wage and the
relative price of non tradables. Because all variables are non stationary, we have recourse
to cointegration methods. Our estimates reveal that 1 percentage point increase in the
productivity of tradables relative to non tradables lowers the relative wage by 0.22% and
appreciates the relative price by 0.64% for the whole sample. The long-run decline in the
relative wage suggests the presence of labor market frictions preventing from the wage
equalization across sectors. Moreover, when assessing the effects of technological change
biased toward the traded sector at the country level, we find that estimates display a large
dispersion across countries, thus suggesting a substantial heterogeneity of labor mobility
costs between the economies of our sample. Using a set of indicators to capture the extent
of labor market frictions, we find that the decline in the relative wage is more pronounced
in countries where the unemployment benefit scheme is more generous, legal protection
against dismissals is stricter, or the worker bargaining power measured by the bargaining
coverage is larger.
In order to account for our evidence, we put forward a variant of the two-sector open
model with tradables and non tradables and search in the labor market along with an
endogenous labor force participation decision in the lines of Heijdra and Ligthart [2009].2
Imperfect mobility across sectors arises because searching for a job is a time-consuming
and thus a costly activity. In our model, the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive
margin (which is assumed to be symmetric across sectors) plays a pivotal role because it
measures the extent of workers’ moving costs: the smaller the elasticity of labor supply, the
larger the switching cost (measured by a utility loss), and thus the lower the degree of labor
mobility across sectors. Conversely, when we let the elasticity of labor supply tend toward
infinity, the case of perfect labor mobility is obtained in the long-run, as assumed by the
standard BS model, so that the relative wage remains unaffected by technological change
biased toward the traded sector, in contradiction with our empirical findings. While letting
the elasticity of labor supply to take intermediate values implies that the relative wage
may fall, the size of its decline depends on the degree of labor market regulation as well.
More specifically, because hiring is also a costly activity which depends on labor market
institutions, firms may be reluctant to raise substantially the number of job vacancies.
Intuitively, our model predicts that that firms’ hiring in the traded sector is more elastic
2A number of variants of the two-sector model with tradables and non tradables have been used to
investigate the real exchange rate and trade balance effects of financial liberalization (see Cordoba (de) and
Kehoe [2000], Bems and Hartelius [2006]). See also Turnovsky [1997] who presents variants of the two-sector
model. While these papers abstract from labor market frictions, our model also builds on Kehoe, Midrigan
and Pastorino et al. [2014] who develop a two sector open economy model with tradables and non tradables
and search unemployment. Our approach and setup are different. First, the authors consider financial
frictions and human capital acquisition through employment. Second, they investigate the ability of their
model to account for the large fall in household debt to income, consumption, and employment during the
Great Contraction of the United States while we analyze the consequences of technological change biased
toward the traded sector on the relative wage.
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to technological change in countries where the unemployment benefit replacement rate is
higher or the worker bargaining power is larger. As a result, the rise in the traded wage is
more pronounced which results in a larger decline in the relative wage of non tradables. Our
model also predicts that firms’ hiring in the non traded sector is less elastic to productivity
growth in countries where the firing cost is larger. Hence, the relative wage falls more
because the non traded wage rises by a smaller amount following productivity gains.
To shed light on key factors determining the long-run adjustment in the relative wage
and the relative price, we analytically break down the responses into two components: i)
a labor market frictions channel (keeping net exports fixed), and ii) a labor accumulation
channel triggered by the long-run adjustment in net exports. First, the model can account
for the decline in the relative wage through the labor market frictions channel only if the
elasticity of substitution for consumption between traded and non traded goods is larger
than one. Intuitively, technological change biased toward the traded sector stimulates hiring
in the traded sector since only in this case does expenditure on tradables rise relative to
expenditure on non tradables. Conversely, an elasticity smaller than one raises the relative
wage by increasing the share of non tradables in expenditure which has an expansionary
effect on hirings in the non traded sector. Second, while the model cannot produce the
decline in the relative wage found in the data when the elasticity of substitution is smaller
than one, technological change biased toward the traded sector also exerts a negative impact
on the relative wage by raising net exports in the long-run. The reason is that higher
productivity induces firms to hire more. Because recruiting workers is a costly activity,
the open economy runs a current account deficit to finance labor accumulation. While the
open economy decumulates traded bonds along the transitional path, the trade balance must
improve in the long-run for the intertemporal solvency condition to hold. Hence, through
the labor accumulation channel, the demand for tradables always rises which induces traded
firms to hire more, thus driving down the relative wage.
While the relative wage response is ambiguous when the elasticity of substitution be-
tween traded and non traded goods is smaller than one, our quantitative analysis reveals
that, for our baseline calibration, the labor accumulation effect always more than offsets
the labor market frictions effect so that the relative wage falls. Moreover, in line with our
evidence, our sensitivity analysis reveals that the relative wage falls more in countries where
the labor market is more regulated. More specifically, we find numerically that raising the
unemployment benefit replacement rate or the worker bargaining power leads to a larger
decline in the relative wage because in this case, net exports rise by a larger amount. In-
tuitively, such economies are characterized by a low labor market tightness which makes
hiring more profitable following higher productivity. As a result, recruiting expenditure
rise more, thus resulting in a larger current account deficit which must be matched in the
long-run by a greater improvement in the balance of trade. Hence, the labor accumulation
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effect exerts a larger negative impact on the relative wage. The sensitivity analysis also
reveals that the decline in the relative wage is more pronounced when increasing the firing
cost because the non traded wage increases less. Intuitively, because the non traded sector
is induced to reduce employment, firms must pay a firing cost which in turn moderates
the positive effect of higher productivity on hiring. While the labor accumulation effect is
almost unchanged, the labor market frictions effect exerts a smaller positive impact on the
non traded wage in countries where legal protection against dismissals is stricter so that
the relative wage falls more following technological change biased toward the traded sector.
The final exercise we perform is to compare the responses of the relative wage and
relative price for each OECD economy in our sample to our empirical estimates. To do so,
we allow for two sets of parameters to vary across countries: the elasticity of substitution
in consumption between tradables and non tradables and the labor market parameters that
we estimate for each economy. It is found that the model predicts the relative wage decline
pretty well and to a lesser extent the rise in the relative price.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide evidence
on the relative price and relative wage effects of relative productivities in the long run. In
section 3, we develop an open economy version of the two-sector model with unemployment
arising from matching frictions in both sectors and characterize the long-run equilibrium
graphically. Section 4 analytically breaks down the relative price and relative wage re-
sponses to a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables. In section 5, we
discuss numerical results and investigate the ability of the model to replicate our empirical
findings for each OECD economy. Section 6 summarizes our main results and concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
In this section, we revisit empirically the effects of technological biased toward the traded
sector by focusing on the relative wage and the relative price responses. We denote the level
of the variable in upper case, the logarithm in lower case, and the percentage deviation from
its initial steady-state by a hat.
2.1 Revisiting the Relative Wage and Relative Price Effects of Techno-
logical Change Biased toward the Traded Sector
To set the stage for the empirical analysis, we revisit the theory that Balassa [1964] and
Samuelson [1964] developed fifty years ago to explain the appreciation of the relative price
of non tradables following higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables.
While the original BS framework assumes perfectly competitive labor markets, we relax this
assumption which allows us to highlight the implications of labor market frictions.
As it is commonly assumed, the country is small in terms of both world goods and
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capital markets, and thus faces an exogenous international price for the traded good P T,?.
We assume that the law of one price holds so that P T = P T,?, and normalize the price of
the traded good on world good markets to unity. Each sector produces Y j by using labor,
Lj , according to a linearly homogenous function:
Y j = AjLj , (1)
where Aj represents the labor productivity index. In order to explore the implications of
labor market frictions for the relative wage and the relative price, we must introduce some
notations that will be useful later.
Because firms face a cost by maintaining job vacancies, they receive a surplus equal
to the marginal revenue of labor Ξj less the product wage W j . Symmetrically, so as to
compensate for the cost of searching for a job, unemployed workers receive a surplus equal
to the product wage less the reservation wage W jR. We denote by Ψ
j the overall surplus
created when a job-seeking worker and a firm with a job vacancy conclude a contract. The
overall surplus is equal to the difference between the marginal revenue of labor and the
sectoral reservation wage:
Ψj ≡ Ξj −W jR, (2)
where ΞN = PAN and ΞT = AT . Denoting by θj the labor market tightness in sector j,
defined as the ratio of job vacancies to unemployed workers, the change of the reservation
wage in percentage is proportional to the labor market tightness, i.e., wˆjR = χ
jW jRθˆ
j where
χj represents the share of the surplus associated with a labor contract in the marginal benefit
of search. Intuitively, when firms post more job vacancies, the labor market tightness rises
which increases the probability of finding a job and thus the reservation wage.
The product wage W j paid to the worker in sector j is equal to the reservation wage
W jR plus a share αW of the overall surplus Ψ
j :
W j = αWΨj +W
j
R, (3)
where the worker bargaining power αW is assumed to be symmetric across sectors. Sub-
tracting the traded wage from the non traded wage by using (3), and differentiating leads
to an equation that relates the change in the relative wage of non tradables to the growth
differential between sectoral labor market tightness and surpluses:
wˆN − wˆT = −χWR
W
(
θˆT − θˆN
)
− αWΨ
W
(
ΨˆT − ΨˆN
)
, (4)
where we assume that initially W j ' W and χjW jR ' χWR and Ψj ' Ψ. In a model
abstracting from labor market frictions, as the standard BS model, searching for a job is
a costless activity so that Ψ and χ are nil; hence sectoral wages rise at the same speed.
Unlike, in a model with labor market frictions, technological change biased toward the
traded sector may lower the non traded wage relative to the traded wage. The reason is as
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follows. First, as captured by the first term on the RHS of (4), higher productivity growth
in tradables relative to non tradables induces traded firms to recruit more than non traded
firms; because agents experience a utility loss when increasing the search intensity for a job
in the traded sector, traded firms must increase wages to attract workers as reflected by
the rise in the ratio θT /θN . Moreover, as shown by the second term on the RHS of (4), by
raising ΨT /ΨN , technological change biased toward the traded sector lowers the non traded
wage relative to the traded wage. Intuitively, searching for a job is time consuming and a
higher ΨT /ΨN covers the increased cost of this activity, the worker obtaining a share equal
to αW .
When a labor contract is concluded with a worker, the representative firm in sector j
receives the marginal revenue of labor Ξj which must cover the recruiting cost plus the
dividend per worker equivalent to (1− αW )Ψj and the wage rate paid to the worker:
Ξj = (1− αW )Ψj +W j . (5)
Subtracting ΞT from ΞN , and differentiating, we obtain a relationship between the relative
price growth and the growth differential between sectoral productivity gains, wages and
surpluses:
pˆ = aˆT − aˆN + W
Ξ
(
wˆN − wˆT )− (1− αW )Ψ
Ξ
(
ΨˆT − ΨˆN
)
, (6)
where we assume that initially Ξj ' Ξ, Ψj ' Ψ, and W j ' W . According to (6), when
abstracting from labor market frictions, sectoral surpluses are nil while sectoral wages
increase at the same speed; as a result, the relative price of non tradables must appreciate
by the same amount as the productivity differential. Unlike, in a model with labor market
frictions, as captured by the second term on the RHS of (6), the relative wage of non
tradables falls because traded firms have to pay higher wages to compensate for the workers’
mobility costs. Moreover, as shown by the third term on the RHS of (6), since traded firms
recruit more than non traded firms, the hiring cost must be covered by an increase in
ΨT /ΨN , the firm obtaining a share equal to 1− αW . Thus, by lowering the relative wage
of non tradables and increasing the hiring cost in the traded sector relative to that in the
non traded sector, the relative price of non tradables appreciates by less than 1% following
a rise in the productivity of tradables relative to non tradables of 1%.
The relative wage and relative price equations described by (4) and (6) respectively,
allow us to explain in what labor market frictions imply that sectoral wages may no longer
rise at the same speed and the elasticity of the relative price of non tradables w.r.t. the
productivity differential may be smaller than one. However, such conclusions are estab-
lished by abstracting from the goods market equilibrium which matters as long as labor
is not perfectly mobile across sectors. In section 4, we show that the full steady-state
can be solved for the relative price and the relative wage, i.e., P = P
(
AT , AN
)
and
Ω ≡ WN/W T = Ω (AT , AN). Because all variables display trends, our empirical strat-
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egy consists in estimating the cointegrating relationships with the productivity discrepancy
between tradables and non tradables.
2.2 Data Construction
Before empirically exploring the relative price and relative wage effects of a productivity dif-
ferential, we briefly describe the dataset we use and provide details about data construction
below and in Appendix A as well. Our sample consists of a panel of eighteen OECD coun-
tries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Germany (DEU),
Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN),
Korea (KOR), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), United
Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA). Our sample covers the period 1970-2007
(except for Japan: 1974-2007), for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries.
To split these eleven industries into traded and non traded sectors, we follow the classi-
fication suggested by De Gregorio et al. [1994]. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing;
Mining and quarrying; Total manufacturing; Transport, storage and communication are
classified as traded industries. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we updated the clas-
sification of De Gregorio et al. [1994] by treating Financial intermediation as a traded
industry. Electricity, gas and water supply; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Ho-
tels and restaurants; Real estate, renting and business services; Community, social and
personal services are classified as non traded industries.3
We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database which provides domestic currency series of
value added in current and constant prices, labor compensation and employment (number
of hours worked) for each sector j (with j = T,N), permitting the construction of price
indices pj (in log) which correspond to sectoral value added deflators, sectoral wage rates
wj (in log), and sectoral measures of productivities aj (in log). The relative price of non
tradables p is the log of the ratio of the non traded value added deflator to the traded value
added deflator (i.e., p = pN − pT ). The relative wage ω is the log of the ratio of the non
traded wage to the traded wage (i.e., ω = wN − wT ). We use sectoral labor productivities
Aj to approximate technical change. Sectoral productivities Ajt at time t are constructed
from constant-price (domestic currency) series of value added Y jt and hours worked L
j
t , i.e.,
Ajt = Y
j
t /L
j
t .
3De Gregorio et al. [1994], classify a sector as tradable if more than 10 percent of its total production
is exported. This classification has been updated by Jensen and Kletzer [2006] who use locational Gini
coefficients to measure the geographical concentration of different sectors and classify sectors with a Gini
coefficient below 0.1 as non-tradable and all others as tradable (the authors classify activities that are traded
domestically as potentially tradable internationally). Unlike De Gregorio et al. [1994] who treat ”Financial
intermediation” as non tradable, we classify this industry as tradable, following Jensen and Kletzer [2006].
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2.3 A First Glance at the Data
We begin by examining the data for the 18 OECD economies over the period 1970-2007.
Figure 1 plots the average relative price growth against the average relative wage growth
which have been scaled (i.e., divided) by the average productivity growth differential be-
tween tradables and non tradables. Quantitatively, the BS model predicts that a 1 per-
centage point increase in the productivity differential leaves unaffected the relative wage of
non tradables and appreciates the relative price of non tradables by 1%. Hence, according
to the BS model, all countries should be positioned at point BS along the X-axis with
coordinates (1,0). However, we find that all countries are positioned to the south-west of
point BS. Quantitatively, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity
differential is associated with a fall in the relative wage which varies between -0.02% for
Belgium and -0.41%for Denmark. Regarding the relative price, we find that its appreciation
varies between 0.34% for Canada to 0.97% for Japan while Norway experiences a fall in the
relative price of non tradables due to the large increase of prices in traded industries such
as ’Mining and Quarrying’ (which accounts for about one fourth of GDP) over 1995-2007.
The data seem to challenge the conventional wisdom that labor mobility would gradually
eliminate wage differences across sectors. If it were the case, the ratio of the non traded
wage to the traded wage would remain unchanged. Unlike the relative wage tends to fall.
Moreover, because non traded wages increase by a smaller amount that that if labor were
perfectly mobile, the relative price of non tradables appreciates by a smaller amount than
that suggested by the standard BS model. To confirm these findings, in the following, we
have recourse to panel data unit root tests and cointegration methods.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
———————————————————————-
We test for the presence of unit roots in the logged relative wage ω (i.e., wN − wT )
and in the difference between the (log) relative price p (i.e., pN − pT ) and the (log) relative
productivities (i.e., aT − aN ). If the wage equalization hypothesis was right, sectoral wages
would increase at the same speed so that the relative wage of non tradables would be
stationary. As a result, the non tradable unit labor cost would rise by the same amount as
the productivity differential. Hence, the difference between the (logged) relative price and
the (logged) relative productivity should be stationary as well.
We consider five panel unit root tests among those most commonly used in the literature:
i) Levin, Lin and Chu’s [2002] test based on a homogenous alternative assumption, ii) a t-
ratio type test statistic by Breitung [2000] for testing a panel unit root based on alternative
detrending methods , iii) Im, Pesaran and Shin’s [2003] test that allows for a heterogeneous
alternative, iv) Fisher type test by Maddala and Wu [1999], and v) Hadri [2000] who
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proposes a test of the null of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root in the panel
data. Results are summarized in Table 1.4
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
———————————————————————-
As shown in the first column Table 1, all panel unit root tests, except for the Levin et al.’s
[2002] test, reveal that the relative wage variable is non-stationary. This finding suggests
that the sectoral wage differential persists in the long run which casts doubt on the wage
equalization hypothesis. Regarding the relative price of non tradables and the productivity
of tradables relative to productivity of non tradables, these variables are found to be non-
stationary. As shown in the last column, the difference between the relative price of non
and the relative productivity is integrated of order one which implies that the productivity
differential is not fully reflected in the relative price.5
2.4 Estimating Long-Run Relationships
We turn to the estimation of the relative wage and the relative price responses to higher
productivity of tradables relative to non tradables. To do so, we regress the (log) relative
wage ω and the (log) relative price p on the (log) relative productivity, respectively:
ωi,t = δi + β
(
aTi,t − aNi,t
)
+ vi,t, (7a)
pi,t = αi + γ
(
aTi,t − aNi,t
)
+ ui,t, (7b)
where i and t index country and time and vi,t and ui,t are i.i.d. error terms. Country fixed
effects are captured by country dummies δi and αi.
Because all variables are non-stationary, we have recourse to cointegration techniques.
Having verified that the assumption of cointegration is empirically supported, we estimate
the cointegrating relationships by using fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and dynamic OLS
(DOLS) procedures for the cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000], [2001].6 Both
estimators give the same results and coefficients β and γ of the cointegrating relationships
are significant at 1%. Two major results emerge. First, estimates reported in the Table 2
reveal that a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity differential between tradables
4In Table 1, LLC and Breitung are the t-statistics developed by Levin et al. [2002] and Breitung
[2000] respectively. IPS denotes the Im, Pesaran and Shin’s [2003] Wtbar test. MW (ADF) and MW (PP)
are the Maddala and Wu’s [1999] P test based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron p-values
respectively. Hadri corresponds to Hadri’s [2000] Zµ test.
5We present the first generation tests which assume that all cross-sections are independent. In the
Technical Appendix, as a robustness check, we also consider some second generation tests that allow for
cross-unit dependencies. We find that second generation tests yield similar conclusions.
6Cointegration tests can be found in the longer version of the paper. The panel FMOLS and DOLS of
Pedroni ([2000], [2001]) are used to estimate the cointegrating vector. The DOLS estimator adds q leads
and lags of 4(aT −aN ) as additional regressors in (4). We set q = 1; our results were identical for q = 2 and
q = 3. We also used alternative estimators: dynamic fixed effects estimator, mean group estimator (Pesaran
and Smith [1995]), pooled mean group estimator (Pesaran et al. [1999]) and the panel DOLS (Mark and
Sul [2003]). The results were almost identical and are relegated in the Technical Appendix.
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and non tradables lowers the relative wage by about 0.22% and appreciates the relative
price by 0.64%. Second, as shown in the second line and the third line of Table 2, the
predictions of the model abstracting from labor market frictions are strongly rejected: the
slope of the cointegrating vector β (γ) is statistically significantly different from zero (one).
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 2 about here >
———————————————————————-
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 3 about here >
———————————————————————-
We now assess if our conclusion for the whole sample also holds for each country. To do
so we run again the regression of relative wage and relative price on relative productivity by
letting β and γ vary across countries. Table 3 show DOLS and FMOLS estimates for the
eighteen countries of our sample. The first result that emerges is that the responses display a
large dispersion across countries. More specifically, when considering the fully modified OLS
estimates and excluding Sweden and Canada, the elasticity of the relative wage to relative
productivity varies between -0.49 for Germany to -0.08 for Norway; while the elasticity of
the relative price varies between 0.36 for Denmark to about 0.90 for Japan approximately.
The second result is that despite these large cross-country variations, technological change
biased toward the traded sector significantly lowers the relative wage in all countries while
non traded prices relative to traded prices rise less than the productivity differential.
2.5 How to Explain the Long-Run Decline in the Relative Wage?
As shown in section 2.1, the less than proportional increase in the relative price relies upon
the fall in the non traded wage relative to the traded wage which so far remains explained.
How to rationalize the long-run decline in the relative wage? Our panel unit root tests reveal
that the sectoral wage differential persists in the long-run, thus indicating the existence of
substantial mobility costs across sectors.
The standard neoclassical model abstracting from labor market frictions predicts that
technological change will trigger a reallocation of resources towards sectors with higher
productivity, thus progressively eliminating the wage differential. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, the literature adopting a structural empirical approach has questioned the assump-
tion of wage equalization and has uncovered substantial mobility costs. Artuc¸ et al. [2010]
estimate that inter-sectoral costs of mobility in the United States are in the order of six
times annual average wages. Lee and Wolpin [2006] find that the cost of moving between
the goods and the services sectors within the same occupation is estimated to be signifi-
cantly larger than moving between occupations within the same sector. According to Lee
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and Wolpin’s estimates over 1968-2000, the mobility cost between sectors ranges from 50
to 75% of average annual earnings while the intersectoral wage differential is persistent in
the long-run. Using 25 years of matched employer-employee data from Brazil, Dix-Carneiro
and Kovak [2015] present evidence of large mobility costs following the country’s trade lib-
eralization in the early 1990s. More precisely, it is found that local shocks have steadily
growing effects on regional formal sector wages and employment for 20 years. Hence, the
impact of local shocks is not dissipated over time through wage-equalizing migration.
While the causes of mobility costs are diverse, they can be classified into two categories:
those related to the workers’ characteristics, thus affecting labor supply, and those related
to rigid labor markets influencing firms’ labor demand. From the worker point of view,
the mobility costs can be interpreted as psychological costs when switching from one sector
to another (see e.g., Dix-Carneiro [2014]), geographic mobility costs (see e.g., Kennan and
Walker [2011]) or can be the result of sector-specific human capital (see e.g., Lee and Wolpin
[2006]). As in Dix-Carneiro [2014], in our model presented in section 3, we consider that
mobility costs experienced by workers are captured by a utility loss. More precisely, we
assume an endogenous labor force participation decision which implies that the allocation of
the labor force across sectors is elastic to the ratio of sectoral reservation wages. Following
technological change biased toward the traded sector, traded firms have to pay higher wages
in order to compensate for the workers’ utility loss when switching. As a result, the relative
wage of non tradables must fall, and more so the lower the elasticity of labor supply at the
extensive margin.
While technological change biased toward the traded sector drives down the relative
wage because traded firms have to pay higher wages than those paid by the non traded
sector in order to attract workers, the size of the decline in the relative wage may vary across
countries. The reason is that labor market institutions influence the elasticity of labor
demand with respect to technological change. Recently, Kambourov [2009] put forward
higher firings costs as an explanation of lower inter-sectoral reallocation following trade
reform episodes in Latin American countries. In the same spirit, we conjecture that the
degree of labor market regulation influences firms’ hiring decisions and thus the relative
wage response to higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables.
Labor market regulation encompasses several dimensions. In our paper, we consider
three aspects: the strictness of employment protection against dismissals, the generosity of
unemployment benefit scheme, and the worker bargaining power. The advantage to restrict
our attention to these three dimensions is that the indicators are available for almost all
countries of our sample and over a long enough time horizon. In the following, we use these
indicators to test our conjecture according to which the relative wage of non tradables
falls more in countries where the labor market regulation is more pronounced. As will be
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clear later when we will go into further detail on the transmission mechanism, the labor
regulation influences the relative wage response through two channels:
• First, we expect the traded wage to increase more in countries where unemployment
benefits are more generous or workers have a larger bargaining power; intuitively, be-
cause theses economies display a low labor market tightness, hiring is more profitable
following technological change because it is easier to fulfill job vacancies; as will be
detailed subsequently, a larger increase in hirings in the short-run leads a higher rise
in net exports in the long-run; consequently, labor demand in the traded sector is
more elastic to productivity growth in countries where the replacement rate or the
worker bargaining power is higher.
• Second, we conjecture that in countries with higher firing costs, the non traded wage
should rise less. More specifically, non traded firms reduce employment and thus
are subject to the redundancy cost; as a result, they are less prone to recruit more
workers. Hence, labor demand in the non traded sector is less elastic to technological
in countries where employment protection is more pronounced.
2.6 Labor Market Regulation and the Relative Wage Response to Tech-
nological Change
To evaluate the role of labor market regulation in explaining the relationship between rela-
tive wage and relative productivity, we proceed as follows. First, we present the indicators
of labor market regulation. Then we empirically explore our conjecture by using a simple
split-sample analysis.
2.6.1 Measures for Labor Market Regulation
To explore its role in the determination of the relative wage response, we measure the degree
of labor market regulation which commonly involves three dimensions:
• The first aspect is the difficulty of redundancy that we measure by the employment
protection legislation (EPL hereafter) index provided by the OECD; this index which
captures the strictness of legal protection against dismissals for permanent workers has
the advantage to be available for all countries of our sample over the period 1985-2007
(except for Korea, 1990-2007).7 As emphasized by Boeri and Van Ours [2006], the
measure for strictness of employment protection can be misleading because regulation
was eased in most European countries for temporary contracts, such as Spain, while
the regulation for workers with permanent contracts hardly changed. Moreover, at
7The OECD indicator takes into account various aspects of firing cost, such as the administrative pro-
cedures, the length of the advance notice period, the amount of the severance payment, the severity of
enforcement. We take the measure for strictness of employment protection for individual and collective
dismissals (regular contracts).
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the same time, the scope of fixed-term contracts was significantly expanded. In order
to have a more accurate measure of the difficulty of redundancy, we use an alternative
indicator by adjusting EPL for regular workers with the share of permanent workers
in the economy. As summarized in Table 9, EPL index is lower in english speaking
countries and higher in Southern (see e.g., Spain), Western (see e.g., the Netherlands),
and Northern (see e.g., Sweden) European countries. By and large, adjusting the
EPL index by excluding from total employment workers employed with a temporary
contract merely modifies the ranking of countries, except for Spain.
• The generosity of unemployment benefit system is measured by using the replacement
rate provided by the OECD. The data we use for the unemployment replacement rate
for both European countries and the US are taken from the OECD database which
calculates the average of the net unemployment benefit (including social assistance
and housing benefits) replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations
and three durations of unemployment (1st year, 2nd and 3rd year, 4th and 5th year).8
Table 9 in the Appendix gives the replacement rate for each country of our sample
and its unweighted average for the twelve European countries. There is considerable
heterogeneity in this indicator, which varies from a low of about 10% for Italy and
26% for the United States to a high of 78% for Denmark. As shown in the last line,
the average EU-12 replacement rate is more than twice as high as the US’s.
• Measuring the extent of the worker bargaining power is a difficult task. In the empir-
ical literature, the worker bargaining power is commonly captured by the bargaining
coverage; we thus use this indicator which gives the proportion of employees covered
by collective bargaining. Excluding Korea since data are only available from 2002,
the bargaining coverage averages 69%. While the bargaining coverage is much lower
than the sample average, in English-speaking (except for Australia) and Japan, it ex-
ceeds 80% in Scandinavian countries and Western countries, except for Spain. Source:
ICTWSS (Jelle Visser [2009]).
As a first pass at gauging the role of labor market regulation in the determination of
the relative wage effects of technological change biased toward the traded sector, we plot
the FMOLS estimates for the relative responses against the three indicators capturing the
extent of labor market regulation in Figure 7. More specifically, Figures 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) plot
the absolute values of βi taken from Table 3 against the EPL index adjusted with the share
of permanent workers, the net unemployment benefit replacement rates, and the bargaining
coverage, respectively. Because time series for the unemployment benefit replacement rate
8It is worthwhile noticing that the unemployment benefit rates are very similar across counties when
considering short-term unemployment (less than one year) but display considerable heterogeneity for long-
term unemployment. We believe that the last measure is more able to capture the extent of generosity of
the unemployment benefit scheme.
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and bargaining coverage are available only from the beginning of the 2000’s for Korea and
thus are too short, we exclude this country from Figures 2(b) and 2(c). In line with our
conjecture, the trend lines in Figures 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) show that the estimated responses of
the relative wage and our three measures of labor market regulation are positively related
across countries.
While for an economy such as the United States, the labor market regulation is unan-
imously low along its three dimensions, the conclusion is not clear-cut for the majority of
OECD economies; for example, while the Italian unemployment benefit scheme is the least
generous, the strictness of employment protection is among the highest; conversely, while
replacement rates are higher than OECD countries’ average in Canada and the United
Kingdom, the firing costs are low in these two economies. Because labor market regu-
lation encompasses three dimensions, we recourse to a principal component analysis in
order to have one overall indicator encompassing all the dimensions of labor market insti-
tutions. We believe that this indicator gives a more accurate measure of the degree of labor
market regulation; in particular, Figure 2(d) displays the traditional distinction between
English-speaking and European economies, labor markets being much less regulated in the
former than the latter countries. Importantly, in accordance with our conjecture, the trend
line is upward sloping, thus suggesting that technological change biased toward the traded
sector lowers the relative wage more in countries where labor market regulation is more
pronounced.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 2 about here >
———————————————————————-
2.6.2 Empirical results
To empirically explore our conjecture according to which the relative wage falls more fol-
lowing higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables in countries with
more regulated labor market, we perform a simple split-sample analysis. Hence, we com-
pare the relative wage behavior of 9 countries with high and 9 economies with low labor
market regulation by running the regression of the relative wage on relative productivity
for each sub-sample:
ωi,t = δi + βc
(
aTi,t − aNi,t
)
+ vi,t, c = H,L, (8)
where βH (βL) captures the response of the relative wage to a productivity differential in
countries with higher (lower) labor market regulation.
The DOLS and FMOLS estimates are reported in the first and the second line of Table 4
for countries with high and low labor market regulation. The two last lines of Table 4 gives
the sub-sample’s average of the corresponding labor market regulation index. As the results
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in Table 4 show, the decline in the relative wage is greater for countries with more regulated
labor markets. While countries providing lower unemployment benefits experience a decline
in the relative wage of -0.16% approximately, the second set of countries with generous
unemployment benefits experience a decline in ω of -0.26%. A similar pattern emerges
when we exploit a second dimension of labor market regulation, namely the strictness of
employment protection. Since series for EPL are available over 1985-2007, we run again
the regression (8) over this period to be consistent. We find that a 1 percentage point
increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables lowers the
relative wage by 0.17% in countries with higher firing costs while ω declines by only 0.13%.
Furthermore, as shown in the third column of Table 4, the worker bargaining power captured
by the bargaining coverage exerts a significant impact on the relative wage response; more
precisely, the relative wage falls by -0.24% instead of -0.18% in countries where the worker
bargaining power is relatively higher. Finally, as displayed in the last column of Table
4, when we recourse to a principal component analysis, we find that countries with more
regulated labor markets experience a larger decline in the relative wage.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 4 about here >
———————————————————————-
To conclude, this empirical evidence suggest that labor market regulation plays a key
role in the determination of the relative wage response to higher productivity in tradables
relative to non tradables. In the following, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model
with a traded and a non traded sector by allowing for labor market frictions. In particular,
our aim is to assess its ability to account for the following set of empirical findings. A
productivity differential of 1% between tradables and non tradables: i) raises the relative
price of non tradables p by 0.64%, ii) lowers the relative wage ω by 0.22%, iii) ω declines
more in countries where the labor market regulation is more pronounced.
3 The Framework
The country is small in terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given
world interest rate, r?.9 The small open economy is populated by a constant number
of identical households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. Households
decide on labor market participation and consumption while firms decide on hours worked.10
The economy consists of two sectors. A sector produces a traded good denoted by the
superscript T that can be exported while the other sector produces a non-traded good
9The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small
open economy.
10More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided
in a Technical Appendix which is available upon request.
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denoted by the superscript N . The setup allows for traded and non-traded goods to be
used for consumption. The traded good is chosen as the numeraire. The labor market, in
the tradition of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides, consists of a matching process within each
sector between the firms who post job vacancies and unemployed workers who search for a
job. Time is continuous and indexed by t.
3.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods
denoted by CT (t) and CN (t), respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of
substitution function:
C
(
CT (t), CN (t)
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT (t)
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (9)
where ϕ is the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle
(0 < ϕ < 1) and φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The economy that we consider consists of a representative household with a measure
one continuum of identical infinitely lived members. At any instant, members in the house-
hold derive utility from consumption goods C and experience disutility from working and
searching efforts. More precisely, the representative household comprises members who en-
gage in only one of the following activities: working and searching a job in each sector, or
enjoying leisure. Assuming that the representative individual is endowed with one unit of
time, leisure is defined as l(t) ≡ 1 − LT (t) − LN (t) − UT (t) − UN (t), where Lj(t) denotes
units of labor time and U j(t) corresponds to time spent on searching for a job in sector j
(with j = T,N). Hence, the labor force is not constant which enables us to focus on both
the transition between employment and unemployment on the one hand, and the transition
between leisure and labor force on the other. Unemployed agents are randomly matched
with job vacancies according to a matching function described later. Since the timing of a
match is random, agents face idiosyncratic risks. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
members in the household perfectly insure each other against variations in labor income.
We consider that the utility function is additively separable in the disutility received
by working and searching in the two sectors. As will become clear later, such specification
makes it impossible to switch immediately from one sector to the other. This can be justified
on the grounds of sector specific skills. The representative household chooses the time path
of consumption and labor force to maximize the following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
 11− 1σC C(t)1−
1
σC − ζ
T
1 + 1
σTL
F T (t)
1+ 1
σT
L − ζ
N
1 + 1
σNL
FN (t)
1+ 1
σN
L
 e−ρtdt, (10)
where ρ is the consumer’s subjective time discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for consumption, and σjL > 0 is the elasticity of labor supply at
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the extensive margin in sector j = T,N . For later use, we denote by uj(t) the sectoral
unemployment rate defined as uj = U
j(t)
Uj(t)+Lj(t)
= U
j(t)
F j(t)
with F j(t) = Lj(t)+U j(t) the labor
force in sector j.
At each instant of time, mj(t)U j(t) unemployed agents find a job in sector j = T,N
and sjLj(t) employed individuals lose their job. Employment in sector j evolves gradually
according to:
L˙j(t) = mj(t)U j(t)− sjLj(t), j = T,N, (11)
where mj(t) denotes the rate at which unemployed agents find jobs and sj is the constant
rate of job separation; 1/mj(t) can be interpreted as the average unemployment duration;
mj is a function of labor market tightness θj(t) which is defined as the ratio of the number
of job vacancies over unemployed agents in sector j.
Households supply Lj(t) units of labor services in sector j = T,N for which they receive
the product wageW j(t). We denote by A(t) the stock of financial wealth held by households
which comprises internationally traded bonds, B(t), and shares on domestic firms. Because
foreign bonds and domestic shares are perfect substitutes, the stock of financial wealth yields
net interest rate earnings r?A(t) . Denoting by T (t) the lump-sum taxes, the flow budget
constraint is equal to households’ real disposable income less consumption expenditure
PC(t)C(t):
A˙(t) = r?A(t)+W T (t)LT (t)+WN (t)LN (t)+RTUT (t)+RTUT (t)−T (t)−PC (P (t))C(t),
(12)
where PC is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non-
traded goods P and Rj represents unemployment benefits received by job seekers in sector
j.
The representative household selects consumption, time dedicated for searching a job
in sector j, and financial wealth:11
C(t) = (PC(t)λ(t))
−σC (13a)
F j(t) =
{
λ(t)
[
mj
(
θj(t)
)
ξj(t) +Rj
]}σjL , (13b)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (ρ− r?) , (13c)
ξ˙j(t) =
(
sj + r?
)
ξj(t)−
W j(t)− (F j(t))1/σjL
λ(t)
 , (13d)
and the appropriate transversality conditions; λ and ξj(t) denote the shadow prices of
wealth and finding a job in sector j, respectively. Eq. (13b) shows that labor market
11First-order conditions consist of (13a) and (13c) together with
(
F j
)1/σj
L = mjξ′,j + Rjλ and ξ˙′ =(
sj + ρ
)
ξ′,j −
[
λW j − (F j)1/σjL]. Denoting by ξj ≡ ξ′,j/λ, using (13a) and (13c), we get (13b) and (13d).
Since ξ′,j is the utility value of an additional job and λ is the marginal utility of wealth, ξj is the pecuniary
value of an additional job.
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participation is a positive function of the reservation wage W jR(t), which is defined as the
sum of the expected value of a job mj(t)ξj(t) and the unemployment benefit Rj . Solving
eq. (13d) forward and invoking the transversality condition yields:
ξj(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[
W j (τ)−W jR (τ)
]
e(s
j+r?)(t−τ)dτ. (14)
Eq. (14) states that ξ is equal to the present discounted value of the surplus from an
additional job consisting of the excess of labor income over the household’s outside option.
Note that as described above, we consider a representative household who splits available
time between leisure and market activities (i.e., time devoted to job search and work).
While labor supply is elastic at the extensive margin, search effort and worked hours are
supplied inelastically.12 For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below when this
causes no confusion.
Applying Shephard’s lemma (or the envelope theorem) yields expenditure in tradables
and non tradables, i.e., PCN = αCPCC, (1− αC)PCC, with αC being the share of non
traded goods in consumption expenditure.13 Intra-temporal allocation of consumption fol-
lows from the following optimal rule:(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
CT
CN
= P φ. (15)
An appreciation in the relative price of non tradables P increases expenditure on tradables
relative to expenditure on non tradables (i.e. CT /PCN ), only when φ > 1.
3.2 Firms
Each sector consists of a large number of identical firms. Both the traded and non-traded
sectors use labor, LT and LN , according to constant returns to scale production functions,
Y T = ATLT and Y N = ANLN . Firms post job vacancies V j to hire workers and face a cost
per job vacancy κj which is assumed to be constant and measured in terms of the traded
good. Firms pay the wage W j decided by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. As
producers face a labor cost wj per employee and a cost per hiring of κj , the profit function
of the representative firm in sector j is:
pij = ΞjLj −W jLj − κjV j − xj .max
{
0,−L˙j
}
, (16)
where Ξj is the marginal revenue of labor with ΞT = AT and ΞN = PAN ; xj is a firing tax
paid to the State when layoffs are higher than hirings, i.e. if L˙j < 0 (see e.g., Heijdra and
Ligthart [2002], Veracierto [2011]). The firing tax is introduced to capture the strictness of
12More precisely, depending on the search parameters captured by sj and mj , labor force is split between
working time and job search. Along the transitional dynamics, using the fact that U j = F j − Lj , agents
supply working time Lj according to the following accumulation equation L˙j = mjU j − sjLj = mjF j −(
mj + sj
)
Lj , where F j is labor force and Lj corresponds to hours worked in sector j supplied by the
representative household.
13Specifically, we have αC =
(1−ϕ)P1−φ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)P1−φ . Note that αC depends negatively on the relative price P as
long as φ > 1.
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legal protection against dismissals. It is worthwhile noticing that firing taxes are modelled as
a tax on reducing employment. While employment is reduced, the shrinking establishment
is hiring; thus the representative firm simultaneously pays a firing tax and receives a hiring
subsidy, i.e., −xjL˙j = xjsjLj − xjf jV j > 0.
Denoting by f j the rate at which a vacancy is matched with unemployed agents, the
law of motion for labor is given by:
L˙j = f jV j − sjLj , (17)
where f jV j represents the flow of job vacancies which are fulfilled; note that f j
(
θj
)
de-
creases with labor market tightness θj .
Denoting by γj the shadow price of employment to the firm, and keeping in mind that
f j is taken as given, the maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:
γj + xj =
κj
f j (θj)
, (18a)
γ˙j = γj
(
r? + sj
)− (Ξj + r?xj −W j) , (18b)
where ΞT = AT and ΞN = PAN . Eq. (18a) requires the marginal cost of vacancy, κj , to be
equal to the marginal benefit of vacancy, f j (.)
(
γj + xj
)
. Solving equation (18b) forward
and invoking the transversality condition yields:
γj(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[
Ξj (τ)− xjsj −W j (τ)] e(sj+r?)(t−τ)dτ. (19)
Eq. (19) states that γj is equal to the present discounted value of the cash flow earned
on an additional worker, consisting of the excess of marginal revenue of labor Ξj over the
wage W j and the expected firing cost xjsj . Following higher productivity Aj , the marginal
revenue of labor Ξj rises; hence hiring becomes more profitable which induces firms to post
job vacancies, but less so in countries with a higher firing cost xj .
Differentiating γj(t)Lj(t) w. r. t. time and inserting the law of motion for employment
(17) together with the dynamic optimality condition (18b), solving forward, and making
use of the transversality condition, we get:14
γj(t)Lj(t) =
∫ ∞
t
pij (τ) e−r
?(τ−t)dτ, j = T,N, (20)
where we used eq. (18a). Eq. (20) states that the value of human assets γjLj (or stock
market value of the firm) is equal to the present discounted value of profits pij .
3.3 Matching and Wage Determination
In each sector, there are job-seeking workers U j and firms with job vacancies V j which are
matched in a random fashion. Assuming a constant returns to scale matching function, the
14We made use of the fact that pij = ΞjLj−W jLj−xj .max
{
0,−L˙j
}
−κjV j since production functions
are linearly homogeneous in labor.
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number of labor contracts M j concluded per job seeker U j gives the probability of finding
a job mj which is increasing in the labor market tightness θj :
mj =
M j
U j
= Xj
(
V j
U j
)αjV
= Xj
(
θj
)αV , αjV ∈ (0, 1) , (21)
where αjV represents the elasticity of vacancies in job matches and X
j corresponds to the
matching efficiency.15 We can also express the number of matches M j per job vacancies:
f j =
M j
V j
= Xj
(
θj
)αjV −1 . (22)
Eq. (22) shows that the probability of fulfilling a job vacancy is higher the lower the labor
market tightness θj .
When a vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, a rent is created which is equal to
ξj + γj + xj , where ξj is the value of an additional job, γj is the value of an additional
worker, and xj corresponds to the hiring subsidy.16 The division of the rent between the
worker and the firm is determined by generalized Nash bargaining over the wage rate:
max
W j
(
ξj
)αjW (γj + xj)1−αjW , αjW ∈ (0, 1) , (23)
where αjW and 1 − αjW correspond to the bargaining power of the worker and the firm,
respectively.17
Solving for (23), the product wageW j is defined as a weighted sum of the labor marginal
revenue plus the interest income from the hiring subsidy and the reservation wage:
W j = αjW
(
Ξj + r?xj
)
+
(
1− αjW
) (F j)1/σjL
λ¯
. (24)
An increase in the marginal product of labor, Ξj , which exerts an upward pressure on labor
demand, or a rise in the labor market tightness, by raising the reservation wage (see eq.
(13b)), pushes up the product wage.18
15Note that the flows of workers in and out of employment are equal to each other in any symmetric
equilibrium, i.e., mjU j = f jV j . Hence equations L˙j = f jV j − sjLj and L˙j = mjU j − sjLj indicate that
the demand for labor indeed equates the supply.
16As mentioned above, the firing tax is modelled as a tax on reducing employment; because firms experi-
ence simultaneously outflow and inflow of workers, this shortcut to encompass the strictness of employment
protection implies that establishments pay firing taxes and receive hiring subsidies at the same time; obvi-
ously, the former amount is larger than the latter.
17It is worthwhile noticing that while the modelling of employment protection as a tax on reducing
employment implies that the firm receives a hiring subsidy, the firing tax reduces γj (see eq. (19)) at the
same time.
18Note that the Nash bargaining wage depends positively on unemployment benefits Rj . To see it more
formally, using the fact that ξj =
α
j
W
1−αj
W
γj , γj+xj = κj/f j ,mj/f j = θj , we have
(
F j
)1/σj
L /λ¯ =
α
j
W
1−αj
W
κjθj+
Rj . Plugging this term into the Nash bargaining wage (24), we have:
W j = αjW
(
Ξj + r?xj
)
+
(
1− αjW
)[ αjW
1− αjW
κjθj +Rj
]
= αW
(
Ξj + κjθj + r?xj
)
+
(
1− αjW
)
Rj .
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3.4 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government. Unemployed benefits RTUT+RNUN are
covered by lump-sum taxes T and the proceeds from the firing tax
∑
j x
j .max
{
0,−L˙j
}
according to the following balanced budget constraint:19
∑
j
xj .max
{
0,−L˙j
}
+ T =
∑
j
RjU j . (25)
3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
Before characterizing the equilibrium dynamics and discussing the steady-state, we have
to impose the market clearing condition for the non traded good according to which non
traded output is only consumed domestically:
Y N (t) = CN (t). (26)
Using the definition of the stock of financial wealth A(t) ≡ B(t)+γT (t)LT (t)+γN (t)LN (t),
differentiating with respect to time, substituting the accumulation equations of labor (11)
and financial wealth (12) together with the dynamic equation for the shadow value of
an additional worker (18b), using the government budget constraint (25) and the market
clearing condition for the non traded good market (26), the accumulation equation for
foreign assets is:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +ATLT (t)− CT (t)− κTV T (t)− κNV N (t). (27)
3.6 Short-Run Static Solutions
In an open economy model with a representative agent having perfect foresight, a constant
rate of time preference and perfect access to world capital markets, we impose β = r?
in order to generate an interior solution. This standard assumption made in the literature
implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ, will undergo a discrete jump when individuals
receive new information and must remain constant over time from then on, i.e. λ = λ¯.
Equation (13a) can be solved for consumption:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
. (28)
A rise in the shadow value of wealth induces agents to cut their real expenditure (i.e.,
Cλ¯ < 0) while an increase in the consumption price index triggered by an appreciation in
the relative price of non-tradables P drives down consumption (i.e., CP < 0). Inserting
(28) into CT = (1− αC)PCC and PCN = αCPCC allows us to solve for consumption in
19In the numerical analysis, we consider government spending for calibration purpose. In this case, where
eq. (25) can be rewritten as follows:
∑
j x
j .max
{
0,−L˙j
}
+ T =
(
RTUT +RNUN
)
+ GT + PGN where
GT and GN government spending on tradables and non tradables, respectively. When L˙j < 0, government
proceeds from the firing costs are redistributed back to agents as lump-sum transfers.
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tradables and non tradables, i.e., CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
and CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
with Cj
λ¯
< 0,
CTP ≷ 0 depending on whether φ ≷ σC and CNP < 0.
Substituting first the short-run static solution for consumption in non tradables CN =
CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, the market clearing condition for the non traded good (26) can be solved for
the relative price of non tradables as follows:
P = P
(
LN , λ¯, AN
)
, (29)
where PLN = ∂P/∂LN = AN/CNP < 0, Pλ¯ = −CNλ¯ /CNP < 0, and PAN = ∂P/∂AN =
LN/CNP < 0.
3.7 Saddle-Path Stability
In this subsection, we analyze saddle-path stability; hence, we first derive the system of
differential equations. To determine the dynamic equation for labor market tightness θj in
sector j, differentiate (18a) w. r. t. time, insert (18b), and eliminate γj by using (18a):
θ˙j =
θj(
1− αjV
)
(sj + r?)− f
j
(
θj
) (
1− αjW
)
Ψj
κj
 , (30)
where the overall surplus from an additional job in sector j denoted with Ψj is defined as
the difference between the marginal product of labor and the reservation wage :
Ψj =
(
Ξj + r?xj
)− (F j)1/σjL
λ¯
. (31)
Differentiating first (13b) w. r. t. time and substituting (13d) yields the dynamic equation
for job seekers:
1
(
F j
) 1
σ
j
L
−1
σjLλ¯
U˙ j =
(F j)1/σjL
λ¯
−Rj
[(sj + r?)+ αjV θ˙jθj
]
−mj (θj)αjWΨj − (F j)
1
σ
j
L
−1
σjLλ¯
L˙j ,
(32)
where we used the fact that W j −W jR = αjWΨj .
Due to our assumption that disutility functions from participating to the labor market in
the traded and the non traded sector are additively separable, hiring and search decisions in
the traded and non traded labor markets are independent which implies that the Jacobian
matrix is block recursive; hence, the saddle-path stability condition in the traded and
non traded sectors can be explored separately. Inserting first appropriate short-run static
solutions, linearizing in the neighborhood of the steady-state, the dynamic system for the
traded (non traded) sector which comprises three equations, i.e. the accumulation equation
for employment (11), the dynamic equation for labor market tightness (30) and the dynamic
equation for job seekers (32), we find that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix for the
traded (non traded) sector is negative.20 Hence, the linearized dynamic system possesses
20When focusing on the non traded sector, we have ΞN = PAN ; in this case, we have to insert the
short-run stock solution for the relative price of non tradables (29) into the dynamic equation for θN and
UN .
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one negative eigenvalue denoted by νj1 and two positive eigenvalues denoted by ν
j
2 and
νj3. Assuming that the Hosios condition holds, i.e., setting α
j
W =
(
1− αjV
)
, eigenvalues
satisfy νj1 < 0 < r
? < νj2, with ν
j
2 = r
? − νj1 > 0, and νj3 = sj + r? > 0. Note that
when the considering the traded sector, the negative and the positive eigenvalues reduces
to νT1 = −
(
sT + m˜T
)
< 0 and νT2 =
(
sT + r? + m˜T
)
> 0.
Denote the long-term values with a tilde, the stable paths for employment, labor market
tightness, and job seekers are given by:21
LT (t)− L˜T = DT1 eν
T
1 t, θT (t)− θ˜T = ωT21DT1 eν
T
1 t, UT (t)− U˜T = ωT31DT1 eν
T
1 t, (33a)
LN (t)− L˜N = DN1 eν
N
1 t, θN (t)− θ˜N = ωN21DN1 eν
N
1 t, UN (t)− U˜N = ωN31DN1 eν
N
1 t,(33b)
where we have normalized ωj11 to unity; it can be proven formally that ω
T
21 = 0, ω
T
31 = −1,
ωN21 < 0, ω
N
31 < 0.
Two features of the two-sector economy’s equilibrium dynamics deserve special atten-
tion. First, the dynamics for labor market tightness in the traded sector θT (t) degenerate
as reflected by ωT21 = 0. Unlike, because the relative price of non tradables adjusts to clear
the non traded good market while labor LN is a state variable, θN (t) exhibits transitional
dynamics; because ωN21 < 0, L
N and θN move in opposite directions. Second, in both
sectors, the number of job seekers U j falls as employment Lj builds up.
Inserting first the short-run static solution for the relative price of non tradables (29) into
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, linearizing (27) around the steady-state, substituting the solutions (33),
and invoking the transversality condition, yields the stable solution for traded bonds B(t)−
B˜ = ΦT
(
LT (t)− L˜T
)
+ ΦN
(
LN (t)− L˜N
)
consistent with the intertemporal solvency
condition:22
B˜ −B0 = ΦT
(
L˜T − LT0
)
+ΦN
(
L˜N − LN0
)
. (34)
Because ΦT < 0 and ΦN < 0, the current account is negatively related to changes in
sectoral employment. Intuitively, to raise employment, firms must post more job vacancies;
because hiring is a costly activity, recruiting expenditure rise which deteriorates the current
account.
21Elements ωN21 and ω
N
31 of the eigenvector (associated with the stable eigenvalue ν
N
1 ) are:
ω12 =
(
2sN + r?
)
+
(
sN + r? − νNi
) ( sN+νNi
m˜N
)
+ m˜N
(
PLNA
N λ¯
vN
FF
+ 1
)
(mN)′U˜N
m˜N
(sN + m˜N + r? − νNi )
< 0, ωN31 =
(
sN + νN1
m˜
)
− (m
′)N U˜N
m˜N
ωN21 < 0.
22The terms ΦT and ΦN are negative and given by:
ΦT ≡ Λ
T
νT1 − r?
= −
(
AT + κT θ˜T
)
(sT + m˜T + r?)
< 0, ΦN ≡ Λ
N
νN1 − r?
< 0.
where ΛN ≡ −CTLN − κN U˜N
(
1− αNV
)
ωN21 − κ
N θ˜N(sN+νN1 )
m˜N
> 0.
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3.8 Steady-State
We now describe the steady-state of the economy which comprises six equations. First,
setting θ˙j = 0 into eq. (30), we obtain the vacancy creation equation (which holds for the
traded sector and non traded sector):
κj
f j
(
θ˜j
) =
(
1− αjW
)
sj + r?
Ψ˜j , Ψ˜j ≡ (Ξj + r?xj)−W jR, j = T,N. (35)
The LHS term of eq. (35) represents the marginal cost of recruiting in sector j = T,N .
The RHS term represents the marginal benefit of an additional worker which is equal to
the share, received by the firm, of the rent created by the encounter between a vacancy and
a job-seeking worker. A rise in labor productivity raises the surplus from hiring Ψ˜j ; as a
result, firms to post more job vacancies which raises the labor market tightness θ˜j .
Second, using the fact that ξ˜j = α
j
W
1−αjW
γ˜j , γ˜j + xj = κ
j
f˜j
(as will be clear later, xT = 0
and xN > 0), m˜
j
f˜j
= θ˜j , to rewrite the reservation wage, the decision of search equation
reads as (which holds for the traded sector and non traded sector):
L˜j =
m˜j
m˜j + sj
[
λ¯
(
αjW
1− αjW
κj θ˜j +Rj
)]σjL
, j = T,N, (36)
where
(
αjW
1−αjW
κj θ˜j +Rj
)
corresponds to the reservation wage W˜ jR reflecting the marginal
benefit from search; note that we have eliminated U˜ j from (13b) by using the fact that in
the long-run the number of unemployed agents who find a job m˜jU˜ j and workers who lose
their job sjL˜j must equalize. According to (36), higher labor market tightness increases
labor L˜j by raising the probability of hiring and thus the employment rate m˜
j
m˜j+sj
. Moreover,
for given λ¯, the rise in the reservation wage α
j
W
1−αjW
κj θ˜j +Rj induces agents to supply more
labor.
Third, setting B˙ = 0 into eq. (27), we obtain the market clearing condition for the
traded good:
r?B˜ +AT L˜T − C˜T − κT U˜T θ˜T − κN U˜N θ˜N = 0, (37)
where C˜T = CT
(
L˜N , λ¯, AN
)
.
The system comprising eqs. (35)-(37) can be solved for the steady-state labor market
tightness, employment, and traded bonds. All these variables can be expressed in terms of
the labor productivity index Aj and the marginal utility of wealth, i.e. θ˜ = θ
(
AT
)
, L˜T =
LT
(
λ¯, AT
)
, θ˜N = θN
(
λ¯, AN
)
, L˜N = LN
(
λ¯, AN
)
, and B˜ = B
(
λ¯, AT , AN
)
.23 Inserting first
B˜ = B
(
λ¯, AT , AN
)
, and L˜j = Lj
(
λ¯, AN
)
, the intertemporal solvency condition (34) can
be solved for the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth:
λ¯ = λ
(
AT , AN
)
. (38)
23Setting first L˙j = 0 into (11), inserting L˜j = Lj
(
λ¯, Aj
)
, one can solve for U j ; then the relationship
V j = θjU j can be solved for the steady-state job vacancy in sector j.
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3.9 Graphical Apparatus
Before turning to the derivation of steady-state effects of technological change biased toward
the traded sector, we characterize the steady-state graphically. Because we restrict our
attention on the long-run equilibrium, the tilde is suppressed for the purposes of clarity.
The steady-state can be described by considering alternatively the labor market or the
goods market.
When focusing on the goods market, the equilibrium can be summarized by two sched-
ules in the (yT − yN , p)-space where we denote the logarithm in lower case. The steady
state is summarized graphically in Figure 3(b).
Denoting by υNX ≡ NX/Y T the ratio of net exports to traded output, combining
the zero current account equation with (26) yields the goods market equilibrium (GME
henceforth) schedule:24
Y T (1− υNX)
Y N
=
CT
CN
, (39)
where −υNX = υB − υTV − υNV and the allocation of aggregate consumption expenditure
between traded and non traded goods follows from (15). Totally differentiating (39) and
denoting the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat gives:
yˆT − yˆN
∣∣∣∣GME = φpˆ− d ln (1− υNX) . (40)
According to (40), the GME-schedule is upward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space with a
slope equal to 1/φ. Following a rise in traded output relative to non traded output, the
relative price of non tradables must appreciate to clear the goods market, and all the more
so as the elasticity of substitution φ is smaller. The 45◦ dotted line allows us to consider
two cases. When φ > 1 (φ < 1), the GME-schedule is flatter (steeper) than the 45◦ dotted
line.
Assuming an elasticity of labor supply identical across sectors, i.e., σjL = σL, so that
the wealth effect does not impinge on the ratio of sector labor, denoting the steady-state
unemployment rate in sector j by uj = s
j
mj+sj
and the share of the surplus associated
with a labor contract in the marginal benefit of search by χj =
α
j
W
1−αj
W
κjθj
W jR
, and totally
differentiating (35) and (36), one obtains the labor market equilibrium (LME henceforth)
schedule:
yˆT − yˆN
∣∣∣∣LME = −ΘN pˆ+ (1 + ΘT ) aˆT − (1 + ΘN) aˆN , (41)
where we set
ΘT ≡ A
T
[
αTV u
T + σLχT
][(
1− αTV
)
ΨT + χTW TR
] > 0, ΘN ≡ PAN [αNV uN + σLχN][(
1− αNV
)
ΨN + χNWNR
] > 0. (42)
24Denoting by υB ≡ r?BY T the ratio of interest receipts to traded output and υjV ≡ κ
jV j
Y T
the ratio of the cost
of hiring in sector j = T,N to traded output, the zero current account equation (26) implies υB−υTV −υNV =
−υNX . While for simplicity purposes, we refer to υNX as the ratio of net exports to traded output, it also
includes hiring expenditure, i.e., NX ≡ Y T − CT = Y T − CT − κTV T − κNV N ++κTV T + κNV N .
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As depicted in Figure 3(b), the LME-schedule is downward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-
space with a slope equal to −1/ΘN (see eq. (41)). An appreciation in the relative price of
non tradables raises the surplus from hiring which induces non traded firms to post more
job vacancies. By raising the expected value of a job, the consecutive rise in the labor
market tightness induces agents to increase the search intensity for a job in the non traded
sector but less so as the elasticity of labor supply σL is lower. More precisely, lower values
of σL indicate that workers are more reluctant to shift from one sector to another; in this
configuration, the term Θj is smaller so that the LME-schedule is steeper. Conversely,
when we let σL tend toward infinity, the case of perfect mobility of labor across sectors is
obtained, as in the standard BS model; in this configuration, the LME-schedule becomes
a horizontal line.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 3 about here >
———————————————————————-
When focusing on the labor market, the model can be summarized graphically by two
schedules in the (lT − lN , ln
(
θT
θN
)
)-space, as shown in Figure 3(a).
Using eq. (36) and setting σjL = σL yields the decision of search-schedule (DS hence-
forth):
LT
LN
=
mT
mN
mN + sN
mT + sT
(
W TR
WNR
)σL
, (43)
where W jR ≡
αjW
1−αjW
κjθj + Rj is the reservation wage. Totally differentiating (43) and
assuming that labor markets display similar features across sectors, i.e., χj ' χ, and uj ' u
yields: (
θˆT − θˆN
) ∣∣∣DS = 1
(αV u+ σLχ)
(
LˆT − LˆN
)
, (44)
where χj =
α
j
W
1−αj
W
κjθj
W jR
is the surplus associated with a labor contract in % of the reservation
wage. According to (44), the DS-schedule is upward-sloping in the (lT − lN , ln
(
θT
θN
)
)-space
where the slope is equal to 1(αV u+σLχ) . The reason is that a rise in the ratio of labor market
tightness θT /θN increases the probability of finding a job in the traded sector relative to
the non traded sector. Hence, a worker gets a larger share of the surplus associated with a
labor contract via higher traded wage, and thereby is induced to supply more labor toward
the traded sector.
As will be useful, we solve the goods market equilibrium (39) for the relative price of
non tradables:
P = P
[(
LT
LN
)
, (1− υNX) ,
(
AT
AN
)]
. (45)
Combining the vacancy creation schedule (35) and the number of matches per job vacancies
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(22) while assuming αjV = αV , gives:
κT
κN
(
sT + r?
)
(sN + r?)
XT
XN
(
θT
θN
)1−αV
=
AT + r?xT −W TR
P (.)AN + r?xN −WNR
. (46)
Totally differentiating (43) and assuming that labor markets initially display similar features
across sectors, i.e., Ξj ' Ξ, Ψj ' Ψ, χjW jR ' χWR yields:
(
θˆT − θˆN
) ∣∣∣V C = − Ξ
(
LˆT − LˆN
)
φ [(1− αV )Ψ + χWR] +
Ξ
[
(φ− 1)
(
AˆT − AˆN
)
− d ln (1− υNX)
]
φ [(1− αV )Ψ + χWR] .
(47)
According to (47), the V C-schedule is downward-sloping in the (lT − lN , ln
(
θT
θN
)
)-space
where the slope is equal to − Ξφ[(1−αV )Ψ+χWR] . Intuitively, as hours worked are shifted
toward the traded sector, non traded output declines relative to traded output; as a result,
the relative price of non tradables must appreciate which encourages non traded firms to
hire more workers; because the non traded sector posts more job vacancies, the ratio of
labor market tightness θT /θN falls.
4 Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects
This section analyzes graphically and analytically the consequences on the relative price
and the relative wage of an increase in relative sectoral productivity AT /AN . It compares
the steady-state of the model before and after the productivity shock biased towards the
traded sector. To shed light on the transmission mechanism, we analytically break down
the relative wage and relative price effects in two components: a labor market frictions
effect and a labor accumulation effect.
4.1 Relative Wage and Relative Price Effects
We first explore the relative price effect of technological change biased toward the traded
sector by equating demand (40) and supply (41) of tradables in terms of non tradables,
both expressed in percentage deviation from its initial steady-state, to eliminate yˆT − yˆN .
One obtains a relationship between the deviation in percentage of the relative price from
its initial steady-state and the productivity growth differential between tradables and non
tradables:
pˆ =
(
1 + ΘT
)
aˆT − (1 + ΘN) aˆN
(φ+ΘN )
+
d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
, (48)
where the term Θj
Θj ≡
Ξj
(
sj + r?
) [
αjV u
j + σLχj
]
Ψj
[(
1− αjV
)
(sj + r?) + αWmj
] . (49)
is the elasticity of sectoral employment Lj w.r.t. the marginal revenue of labor Ξj . In order
to facilitate the discussion, we assume that Θj ' Θ. As will be clear later, Θ is a measure
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of the degree of labor mobility across sectors.25 Under this assumption, eq. (48) reduces
to:
pˆ =
(1 + Θ)
(
aˆT − aˆN)
(φ+Θ)
+
d ln (1− υNX)
(φ+ΘN )
, (50)
where d ln (1− υNX) ' −dυNX by using a first-order Taylor approximation.
Eq. (50) breaks down the relative wage response into two components: a labor market
frictions effect and a labor accumulation effect. The first term on the RHS of eq. (50)
corresponds to the labor market frictions effect. Through this channel, higher productivity
growth in tradables relative to non tradables tends to appreciate the relative price. The
reason is that technological change biased toward the traded sector raises traded output
relative to non traded output so that the relative price of non tradables must increase to
clear the goods market. Importantly, the size of the relative price appreciation is given by
the elasticity (1+Θ)(φ+Θ) . When we let σL tend toward infinity, workers no longer experience
a utility loss when shifting from one sector to another; hence the case of perfect mobility
of labor across sectors is obtained as reflected by the term Θ that tends toward infinity;
in this configuration, a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables appreciates the relative price by 1% as well, in line with the
prediction of the standard BS model.26 Graphically, as shown in Figure 4(a), the LME-
schedule is a horizontal line because the allocation of the labor force across sectors is
perfectly elastic to the ratio of sectoral reservation wages. A productivity shock biased
toward the traded sector shifts higher the LME-schedule which results in a relative price
appreciation, from p0 to pBS , i.e., by the same amount as the productivity differential. The
LME-schedule intercepts the 45◦ line at point BS′.
As long as σL < ∞, workers experience a mobility cost when moving; in this case,
Θ takes finite values while graphically, the LME-schedule is downward sloping in the
(yT − yN , p)-space. When workers experience mobility costs, the relative price of non
tradables is jointly determined by technological and demand conditions. More precisely,
the elasticity φ between traded and non traded goods in consumption plays a pivotal role in
the determination of the relative price response. Graphically, technological change biased
toward the traded sector shifts to the right the LME-schedule from LME0 to LME1:
this shift corresponds to the labor market frictions effect. If φ > 1, the GME-schedule
is flatter than the 45◦ line so that the interception is at G′; since p′ < pBS , the relative
price appreciates by less than the productivity productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables, in line with our empirical findings. Intuitively, when the elasticity is
25For the baseline calibration, while labor market parameters are allowed to vary across sectors ΘT and
ΘN are very similar if not identical. It is only when the firing costs are important that ΘT and ΘN differ
substantially.
26Formally, we have:
lim
σL→∞
(1 + Θ)
(φ+Θ)
= 1.
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larger than one, households are willing to substitute traded for non traded goods so that
a moderate (i.e., less than 1%) appreciation in the relative price is necessary following a
rise in the productivity differential (by 1 percentage point). Conversely, if φ < 1, the
relative price must appreciate more than proportionately (i.e., by more than 1%) following
higher productivity of tradables relative to non tradables (by 1 percentage point). In
this configuration, the GME-schedule is steeper that the 45◦ line so that the LME1-
schedule intercepts the GME-schedule at a point which lies to the north west of BS′.
Hence, through the labor market frictions channel, a 1 percentage point increase in the
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables appreciates the relative price
of non tradables by less (more) than 1% if traded and non traded goods are substitutes
(complements).
The second term on the RHS of eq. (50) reveals that technological change biased to-
ward the traded sector also impinges on the relative price of non tradables by affecting net
exports and hiring expenditure expressed as a share of traded output, as summarized by
dυNX . More precisely, through the labor accumulation channel, higher productivity growth
in tradables relative to non tradables increases υNX which exerts a negative impact on the
relative price by raising the demand for tradables in the long-run. Intuitively, higher labor
productivity (i.e., a rise in Aj) raises the shadow value of an additional worker γj and thus
induces firms in both sectors to hire more. Because job vacancies V j are a jump variable,
it overshoots on impact. Since hiring is a costly activity, recruiting expenditure rise sub-
stantially. While employment builds up, the open economy finances labor accumulation by
running a current account deficit in the short-run. For the intertemporal solvency condition
to hold, the decumulation of traded bonds must be offset by a steady-state increase in net
exports. The combined effect of the improvement in the trade balance and permanently
increased hiring expenditure has an expansionary effect on the demand for tradables which
drives down the relative price of non tradables. Graphically, in terms of Figure 4(a), the
labor accumulation channel shifts the GME-schedule to the right, regardless of the value
of the elasticity of substitution between traded and non traded goods. It is worthwhile
noticing that a change in υNX no longer impinges on the relative price p and thus the labor
accumulation channel vanishes when we let σL tend toward infinity, i.e. if agents are not
subject to switching costs from one sector to another.27 In this case, the GME1-schedule
intercepts the LME1-schedule at BS1. Unlike, when σL < ∞, the intercept is at G1 if
φ > 1. In this case, the relative price unambiguously appreciates by less than 1% following
a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables. While through the labor market frictions channel, pˆ > 1% if φ < 1, the labor
market accumulation channel exerts a negative impact on p, and all the more so the smaller
the elasticity φ, as shown by the second term on the RHS of (50).
27When σL →∞, the term 1φ+Θ tends toward zero.
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We now explore the long-run response of the relative wage of non tradables to a produc-
tivity differential. To do so, we first totally differentiate the vacancy creation equation (35)
that we substitute into the Nash bargaining wage (24) expressed in rate of change relative
to the steady-state:28
wˆj = ΩjΞˆj , Ωj ≡ Ξ
j
W j
αW
[(
1− αjV
) (
sj + r?
)
+mj
]
[(
1− αjV
)
(sj + r?) + αWmj
] > 0, (51)
where ΞˆT = aˆT and ΞˆN = pˆ+ aˆN . Calculating ωˆ ≡ wˆN − wˆT by using (51) and substituting
(48) yields the deviation in percentage of the relative wage from its initial steady-state:
ωˆ =
{
ΩN
[(
1 + ΘT
)
aˆT + (φ− 1) aˆN
(φ+ΘN )
]
− ΩT aˆT
}
− ΩN dυNX
φ+ΘN
(52)
To facilitate the discussion, we assume that Θj ' Θ and Ωj ' Ω.29 Under theses assump-
tions, eq. (52) reduces to:
ωˆ = −Ω
[
(φ− 1)
φ+Θ
(
aˆT − aˆN)+ dυNX
φ+Θ
]
. (53)
When assuming perfect mobility of labor across sectors, i.e., if we let σL tend toward infinity,
we have Θ → ∞; hence eq. (53) shows that a productivity differential leaves unaffected
the relative wage. Unlike, as long as workers experience a utility loss when shifting (i.e.,
assuming σL < ∞), technological change biased toward the traded sector impinges on the
relative wage through two channels.
When keeping fixed υNX , eq. (53) reduces to −Ω (φ−1)φ+Θ
(
aˆT − aˆN). Hence, through
the labor market frictions channel, higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non
tradables lowers the relative wage ω only if φ > 1. As discussed above, technological change
biased toward the traded sector raises traded output relative to non traded output which
appreciates the relative price of non tradables; with an elasticity of substitution φ greater
than one, the demand for tradables rises more than proportionally. By raising the share
of tradables in total expenditure, higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non
28Totally differentiating the wage rate W j (24) gives:
wˆj =
αWΞ
j
W j
Ξˆj + (1− αW ) χ
jW jR
W j
θˆj .
Totally differentiating the vacancy creation equation (35) yields
θˆj =
ΞjΞˆj[(
1− αjV
)
Ψj + χjwjR
] .
Substituting the latter equation into the former and using the fact that at the steady-state, χjW jR = m
jξj =
mjα
j
W
Ψj
sj+r?
, one obtains (51).
29For the baseline scenario of our quantitative analysis, i.e., when calibrating to a typical OECD economy,
ΩT and ΩN are almost identical.
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tradables induces traded firms to hire more which lowers the relative wage. In terms of
Figure 4(b), technological change biased toward the traded sector shifts to the right the V C-
schedule from V C0 to V C ′. Unlike, with an elasticity φ smaller than one, the V C-schedule
would shift to the left because the share of non tradables rises which has an expansionary
effect on recruitment in the non traded sector. Hence, in this case, the relative wage of non
tradables increases instead of declining, in contradiction with our empirical findings.
As captured by the second term on the RHS of eq. (53), technological change biased
toward the traded sector also impinges on the relative wage through a labor accumulation
channel. More specifically, by raising steady-state net exports, a productivity differential
encourages traded firms to hire more which exerts a negative impact on the relative wage.
Graphically, as depicted in Figure 4(b), higher productivity growth in tradables relative
to non tradables shifts further to the right the V C-schedule from V C ′ to V C1. Hence,
while ω unambiguously declines if the elasticity of substitution is larger then one, when
φ < 1, the relative wage response to a productivity differential is ambiguous. In the latter
case, technological change biased toward the traded sector drives down ω through the labor
accumulation channel while it increases the relative wage through the labor market frictions
channel. We address this ambiguity numerically later.
In contrast to most macroeconomic models of search, we endogenize labor supply along
the extensive margin. When the labor force participation decision is endogenized, the
situations of total immobility (σL = 0) and perfect mobility (σL →∞) of labor emerge as
special cases. If we let σL = 0, the situation of total labor immobility is obtained. Because
the mobility costs are prohibitive, the labor force F j is fixed in both sectors. As will be
clear later when discussing quantitative results, such a configuration makes less likely our
model to replicate our empirical findings, in particular when φ < 1. Graphically, in terms
of Figure 4(b), setting σL = 0 rotates to the left the DS-schedule. With an elasticity φ
smaller than one, technological change biased toward the traded sector shifts to the left the
V C-schedule through the labor market frictions channel; because it moves along a steeper
DS-schedule, the ratio of labor market tightness θT /θN falls more which in turn pushes up
further the relative wage, thus making less likely to replicate the decline in ω.30
Conversely, when we let σL tend toward infinity, workers are no longer subject to switch-
ing costs; in this configuration, we have Θj →∞ so that eq. (48) reduces to pˆ = (aˆT − aˆN),
as in the standard BS model. Inserting the relative price equation into ΞˆN = pˆ + aˆN , the
deviation in percentage of the relative wage from its initial steady-state (51) can be rewrit-
ten as ωˆ =
(
ΩN − ΩT ) aˆT . Such an equality reflects the fact that even if mobility costs
are absent, technological change biased toward the traded sector may produce different
30It is worthwhile noticing that when σL = 0, the change in relative labor L
T /LN is achieved through
a decline in sectoral unemployment. For example, when φ > 1, LT /LN unambiguously increases because
more unemployed workers find a job in the traded sector while the labor force FT is fixed.
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sectoral wage responses because search parameters vary across sectors. However, the quan-
titative analysis conducted in section 5 reveals that the elasticity Ωj of sectoral wages w.r.t.
the marginal revenue of labor is almost identical across sectors, i.e., ΩT ' ΩN ; hence, if
σL →∞, we would have ωˆ ' 0.
4.2 Implications of Labor Market Regulation
So far, we have shown that the relative wage of non tradables no longer remains fixed
following technological change biased toward the traded sector because workers experience
a mobility cost (as captured by 0 < σL < ∞) which must be covered by higher wages.
While searching for a job is costly because it is time consuming, in a model with search
in the labor market, hiring is also a costly activity. By affecting the recruiting cost, labor
market institutions determine the elasticity of labor demand to technological change. More
precisely, the more labor demand in the traded sector increases relative to that in the non
traded sector, the larger the decline in the relative wage of non tradables. In this section,
our objective is to assess the ability of our model to account for our empirical findings
established in section 2 according to which the relative wage falls more in countries where
unemployment benefits are more generous, the worker bargaining power is larger or legal
protection against dismissals is more stringent. Because the transmission mechanism varies
according the type of labor market institution, we differentiate between the firing cost on
the one hand, the generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme and the worker bargaining
power on the other.
Implications of a Higher Firing Tax
In our model, the strictness of legal protection against dismissals is captured by a firing
tax denoted by xj paid to the State by the representative firm in the sector which reduces
employment. Technological change exerts two opposite effects on labor Lj . On the one
hand, by producing a positive wealth effect, as reflected by a fall in the shadow value of
wealth λ¯ (38), a higher productivity exerts a negative impact on employment by driving
down labor supply (see (36)). On the other hand, by increasing the marginal revenue of la-
bor, a rise in Aj induces firms to recruit more which pushes up labor. Because technological
change is biased toward the traded sector, employment in the traded sector increases while
labor in the non traded sector declines. According to (19), higher productivity induces non
traded firms to post more job vacancies but less so as the firing tax is increased because
the surplus from hiring rises by a smaller amount. Since labor demand in the non traded
sector increases less in countries where the firing tax is higher, as reflected by a smaller rise
in the labor market tightness θN , the relative wage of non tradables falls more.
The implications of a higher firing tax is depicted in Figure 5(a) where we assume an
elasticity between traded and non traded goods in consumption φ larger than one. In
this configuration, as mentioned previously, technological change biased toward the traded
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sector shifts to the right the V C-schedule. As highlighted in Figure 5(a), higher productivity
growth in tradables relative to non tradables shifts further to the right the V C-schedule
from V C ′ to V C ′′, thus resulting in a larger increase in θT /θN because hiring in the non
traded sector which decumulates employment is limited by the firing tax. Consequently,
the relative wage ω declines more, in line with our empirical findings, through a stronger
labor market frictions effect. However, a higher firing tax also moderates the decline in the
relative wage since net exports increase less. Intuitively, by curbing recruiting expenditure,
the productivity differential leads to a smaller current account deficit. As a result, net
exports must rise less.31
In terms of eq. (52), a higher firing tax (paid by non traded firms) lowers substantially
the term ΩN which is the elasticity of the non traded wage to the marginal revenue of
labor.32 The term in braces in eq. (52) which captures the labor market frictions channel is
thus higher in absolute terms (or more negative) when φ > 1. Conversely, when φ < 1, the
term in braces in eq. (52) becomes positive but smaller as the firing tax x is increased. As
mentioned above, in countries where the firing tax is higher, net exports increase less which
lowers dυNX > 0 in the last term of eq. (52) and thus moderates the labor accumulation
effect which exerts a negative impact on ω.33
In conclusion, increasing the firing tax exerts two opposite effects on the relative wage
response to technological change biased toward the traded sector. On the one hand, higher
productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables produces a larger decline in ω as
x is raised by limiting the expansionary effect on labor demand in the non traded sector. On
the other hand, increasing the firing tax moderates the expansionary effect of a productivity
differential on the demand of tradables in the long-run (captured dυNX > 0) and thus the
steady-state fall in the relative wage. We will address this ambiguity numerically.
Implications of a More Generous Unemployment Benefit Scheme or a Higher
Worker Bargaining Power
In our framework, the generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme is captured by
the level of Rj ; unemployment benefits are assumed to be a fixed proportion r of the
wage rate W j , i.e., Rj = rW j . Additionally, a higher worker bargaining power measured
empirically by the bargaining coverage is captured by the parameter αW which is assumed
to be identical across sectors.
31Because our quantitative analysis shows that increasing substantially the firing tax merely affects the
labor accumulation channel, for clarity purposes, we restrict our attention to the labor market frictions in
Figure 5(a).
32A higher firing tax lowers both ΩN and ΘN which exerts opposite effects on the first term in braces in
eq. (52). Our quantitative analysis indicates that the effect of a lower ΩN on ωˆ predominates. For clarity
purposes, we concentrate on this term while leaving aside the impact on ΘN in order to avoid unnecessary
complications.
33To be more precise, a higher firing tax lowers both ΩN and ΘN and moderates the change in net exports
dυNX > 0 which exert opposite effects on ωˆ. as shown by the last term in eq. (52); our quantitative analysis
reveals that the firing tax tends to moderate the labor accumulation effect.
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In contrast to a firing tax, raising the unemployment benefit replacement rate or the
worker bargaining power leads to a larger long-run rise in net exports and thus amplifies
the decline in the relative wage through the labor accumulation channel. The reason is
as follows. In countries where unemployment benefits are more generous or the worker
bargaining power is larger, there are more job-seeking workers and less job vacancies, thus
resulting in lower labor market tightness θj in both sectors. Consequently, following higher
productivity, firms are more willing to recruit additional workers because hiring is more
profitable as the probabilities of fulfilling vacancies (f j) are much higher. Hence, the open
economy experiences a larger current account deficit along the transitional path which
must be matched in the long-run by a greater improvement in the balance of trade. By
amplifying the rise in net exports and thus the demand for tradables, technological change
biased toward the traded sector exerts a larger negative impact on the relative wage in
countries with a higher replacement rate r or a larger worker bargaining power αW . While
a productivity differential lowers further the relative wage through the labor accumulation
channel, it also moderates its decline through the labor market frictions channel. More
precisely, by reducing the cost of hiring (because the probability f j is higher) and by
raising the marginal benefit of search, larger values of r or αW increase the mobility of
labor across sectors which in turn moderates the change in the relative wage through the
labor market market frictions channel.
The implication of a higher replacement rate r or a larger worker bargaining power
αW is depicted in Figure 5(b) where we consider an elasticity of substitution φ larger than
one. Figure 5(b) shows that technological change biased toward the traded sector shifts
further to the right the V C-schedule from V C1 to V C2 in countries where the replacement
rate r is higher or the worker bargaining power αW larger. As mentioned above, the larger
increase in net exports amplifies the expansionary effect on hiring in the traded sector which
pushes up further the ratio of labor market tightness θT /θN . Hence, the relative wage of
non tradables falls more through a stronger labor accumulation effect. Raising r or αW
also modifies the labor market frictions channel by increasing the mobility of labor across
sectors.34 Because we find numerically that modifying r or αW merely modifies the relative
wage response to technological change biased toward the traded sector through the labor
market frictions channel, we restrict our attention to the labor accumulation channel in
Figure 4(b).
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 5 about here >
34In countries with a higher worker bargaining power αW , firms are willing to recruit more (because it
is relatively less costly due to a higher probability f j) while workers are less reluctant to move from one
sector to another (since they receive a larger share χ of the surplus associated with a labor contract in
the marginal benefit of search). In economies with a more generous unemployment benefit scheme, while
workers are more reluctant to move from one sector to another (because χ falls), the vacancy creation is
more elastic to technological change. Because the latter effect predominates, the labor mobility rises.
34
———————————————————————-
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effects of a labor productivity differential quantitatively. For
this purpose we solve the model numerically.35 Therefore, first we discuss parameter values
before turning to the long-term consequences of higher productivity in tradables relative to
non tradables.
5.1 Calibration
To calibrate our model, we estimated a set of parameters so that the initial steady state is
consistent with the key empirical properties of a representative OECD economy. While at
the end of the section we move a step further and calibrate the model for each economy, we
first have to evaluate the ability of the two-sector open economy model with labor market
frictions to accommodate the decline in the relative wage. Our sample covers the eighteen
OECD economies in our dataset. Since we calibrate a two-sector model with labor market
frictions, we pay particular attention to match the labor market differences between the
two sectors. To do so, we carefully estimate a set of sectoral labor market parameters
parameters shown in Table 9. Because we consider an open economy setup with traded and
non traded goods, we provide the non-tradable content of employment, consumption, and
government spending, and gives the productivity in tradables in terms of non tradables, for
all countries in our sample in Table 7. Our reference period for the calibration of the non
tradable share given in Table 7 is running from 1990 to 2007 while labor market parameters
have been computed over various periods due to data availability. unemployment benefit
replacement rates and the firing cost shown in the latter two columns of Table 9 correspond
to averages over 1980-2007 (except Korea: 2001-2007) and 1980-2005, respectively.36
We start with the values of the labor market parameters which are chosen so as to
match a typical OECD economy.37 We choose the model period to be one month, which
corresponds to the frequency of the employment data we use. Some of the values of the labor
market parameters can be taken directly from data, but others need to be endogenously
calibrated to fit a set of labor market features. To capture the labor labor market of a typical
35Technically, the assumption β = r? requires the joint determination of the transition and the steady
state.
36To calibrate the labor market for the traded and the non traded sector, we need to estimate the job
finding and the job destruction rate for each sector. To do so, we apply the methodology developed by
Shimer [2012]. Appendix B.2 presents the source and construction of the data while more details about
the measures of the job finding probability for unemployed workers and the exit probability for employed
workers can be found in the Technical Appendix.
37Due to the availability of data, we were able to estimate sectoral unemployment rates for 10 European
countries and 5 OECD economies as ILO does not provide series for sectoral employment and unemployment
for France, the Netherlands, and Norway at a sectoral level. Regarding Korea, while ILO provides data
necessary for the computation of sectoral unemployment rates, the OECD does not provide unemployment
by duration for this country which makes unable the computation of job finding and job destruction rates.
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OECD economy which is chosen as the baseline scenario, we take unweighed average values
shown in the last line of 9. We set the matching efficiency in the traded (non traded) sector
XT (XN ) to 0.307 (0.262) and the job destruction rate sT (sN ) to 1.48% (1.54%) to target
an unemployment rate uT (uN ) of 7.9% (8.3%) and a monthly job finding rate mT (mN ) of
17.4% (17.0%). We obtain an overall unemployment rate u of 8.1% in line with our estimate
shown in Table 9. To target the labor market tightness in the traded sector, θT = 0.24,
and in the non traded sector, θN = 0.34, we set the share of recruiting costs in GDP to
2.3% by choosing κT = 1.482 and κN = 0.582. In the numerical analysis, we assume that
unemployment benefits are a fixed proportion of the wage rate, i.e. Rj = rW j , with r the
replacement rate. The unemployment benefit replacement rate has been set to 52.4%, in
line with our estimates shown in Table 9.
Because the features of labor markets vary substantially across OECD economies, we
also analyze two different calibrations of the model, one aimed at capturing the U.S. labor
market, the other aimed at capturing Europe with its more ’rigid’ labor market. To calibrate
a typical European labor market, we take the EU-12 unweighed average.38 For these both
calibrations, we present the implications of a productivity differential. To capture the U.S.
(EU-12) sectoral labor markets, we set the matching efficiency parameters XT and XN to
0.620 (0.231) and 0.521 (0.197), respectively and the job destruction rates sT and sN to
2.2% (1.2%) and 2.4% (1.2%), to target an unemployment rate in the traded sector uT and
in the non traded sector uN of 4.8% (8.7%) and 5.3% (9.3%), respectively, and a monthly
job finding rate mT in the traded sector and in the non traded sector mN of 44.4% (12.4%)
and 44.0% (12.2%), respectively, in line with the data shown in Table 9. It is worth noting
this allows us to match the unemployment rate for the US and EU-12 which averages 5.2%
and 9.1%. Furthermore, the replacement rates has been set to 26.1% and 55.9%. To target
the sectoral labor market tightness for the US (EU-12), i.e. θT = 0.43 (θT = 0.21) and
θN = 0.65 (θN = 0.30), respectively, we choose κT = 1.333 (κT = 1.535) and κN = 0.481
(κN = 0.605).
Using U.S. data, Barnichon [2012] reports an elasticity of the matching function with
respect to unemployed workers of about 0.6, an estimate which lies in the middle of the
plausible range reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001]. Hence, we set the elasticity
1 − αjV (with j = T,N) of the matching function with respect to unemployed workers to
0.6.39 As it is common in the literature, we impose the Hosios [1990] condition, and set
the worker bargaining power αW to 0.6 in the baseline scenario but conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to this parameter by setting αW to 0.9 while keeping fixed 1− αV .
We model firing costs as a tax that firms have to pay to the State when their employment
38For sectoral unemployment rates, and monthly job finding and job destruction rates, we take the EU-10
unweighed average due to data availability.
39Due to the lack of empirical estimates at a sectoral level, we assume 1−αjV to be identical across sectors.
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levels decline, i.e. if L˙j < 0. To calibrate the firing cost, we take data from the Fondazione
De Benedetti which provides series for the eighteen countries of our sample over the period
1980-2005. To compute the firing tax, we add the advance notice and the severance payment
which are averages after 4 and 20 years of employment. Since the advance notice and the
severance payment are both expressed in monthly salary equivalents, we have xj = τW j
with τ ≥ 0. Values of τ are shown in the last column of Table 9. For the baseline calibration,
we set the firing tax τ to 4.2.40 When calibrating to the US (EU-12) economy, we set τ = 0
(τ = 4.3).
Next, we turn to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin σL. Empir-
ical studies based on micro data generally report much larger values for the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply on the extensive margin than on the intensive margin. More precisely,
while the former falls in the range of 0.6 to 0.8, the latter falls in the range of 0.1 to 0.5.
We choose σL to be 0.5 in our baseline setting which is close to recent microeconometric
estimates, see e.g., the discussion by Haefke and Reiter [2011], but conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to this parameter.41 Furthermore, in order to target a non tradable
content of labor of 66% which corresponds to the 18 OECD countries’ unweighted average
shown in the last line of Table 7, we set ζT to 1 and ζN to 0.15 (see eq. (10)).
We now turn to the calibration of consumption-side parameters that we use as a baseline.
In light of our discussion above, besides country’s labor market regulation, φ plays a key
role in the determination of the relative wage and relative price responses to a productivity
differential. Building on our panel data estimations, we set the elasticity of substitution to
1 in the baseline calibration.42 But we conduct a sensitivity analysis by considering alter-
natively a value of φ smaller or larger than one (i.e., φ is set to 0.6 and 1.5, respectively).43
The weight of consumption in non tradables 1 − ϕ is set to 0.42 to target a non-tradable
content in total consumption expenditure (i.e. αC) of 42%, in line with the average of our
estimates shown in the last line of Table 7. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption σC is set to 1.
For calibration purposes, we introduce government spending on traded and non traded
40As mentioned previously, because traded employment monotonically increases while the non traded
sector reduces continuously employment following a productivity differential, only the non traded sector is
subject to the firing tax.
41Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Fiorito and Zanella [2008] find that aggregate time-series
results deliver a Frisch elasticity of about 0.8, the contribution of employment (extensive margin) accounting
for about 4/5 of the aggregate elasticity. Using Japanese data, Kuroda and Yamamoto [2007] report a Frisch
elasticity on the extensive margin which falls in the range of 0.6 to 0.8 for both sexes.
42As shown in Table 8, estimates of φ for Belgium and Italy are either negative or not statistically
significant. Hence, column 1 of Table 6 reports only consistent estimates for the elasticity of substitution φ
between traded and non traded goods which average to 0.9. The advantage of setting φ to 1 in the baseline
scenario is twofold. First, the share of non traded goods in consumption expenditure αC coincides with the
weight of the non traded good in the overall consumption bundle 1 − ϕ if φ = 1. Second, setting φ = 1
implies that only the labor accumulation channel is (mostly) in effect as the labor market frictions channel
almost totally vanish which allows us to highlight the intertemporal effect trigged by the hiring boom.
43These values for φ of 0.6 and 1.5 correspond roughly to the averages of estimates of φ for countries with
φ < 1 and φ > 1, respectively.
37
goods in the setup.44 We set GN and GT so as to yield a non-tradable share of government
spending of 90%, and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%. Close to the averages
of the values reported in the last line of Table 7, the ratios GT /Y T and GN/Y N are 4%
and 35% in the baseline calibration.
We consider a permanent increase in the productivity index Aj of both sectors biased
towards the traded sector so that the labor productivity differential between tradables and
non tradables, i.e., aˆT − aˆN , is 1%. While in our baseline calibration we set φ = 1, σL = 0.5,
αW = 0.6, r = 0.524, τ = 4.2, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to these five
parameters by setting alternatively: φ to 0.6 and 1.5, σL to 0, 0.2 and 1, αW to 0.9, r to
0.782, and τ to 13.45 Finally, in the latter two columns of Table 5, we compare the results
for the US economy with those obtained for a typical European economy (EU-12).
5.2 Discussion
Before analyzing in the detail the role of labor market frictions in shaping the long-run
dynamics of the relative price and the relative wage in response to technological change
biased toward the traded sector, we recall the set of observations established in section
2. For the whole sample, our empirical findings indicate that a productivity differential of
1% lowers the relative wage by 0.22%. When performing a sample-split analysis, estimates
reveal that the relative wage falls more in countries where the labor market regulation is
more pronounced. We also find that the elasticity of the relative price with respect to the
relative productivity is equal to 0.64 for the whole sample.
The relative wage and relative price responses are summarized in Table 5. Since the
relative wage response is ambiguous when the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one,
it is convenient to first discuss the numerical results in this configuration. Panels C and
D of Table 5 report the long-run changes for the relative wage WN/W T and the relative
price of non traded goods PN/P T expressed as a percentage. The numbers reported in the
first line of each panel give the (overall) responses of these variables to 1 percentage point
increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables. Column 1
of Table 5 shows that when abstracting from labor market frictions, i.e., setting κj = 0
and σL → ∞, the model cannot account for our empirical evidence. Intuitively, because
hiring and searching for a job are costless activities, labor is perfectly mobile across sectors.
Hence, technological change biased toward the traded sector leaves unaffected the relative
wage (i.e., ωˆ = 0). Because the non tradable unit labor cost increases at the same speed as
the productivity differential, the relative price appreciates by 1%.
44The market clearing condition for the traded good and the non traded good at the steady-state are
r?B + Y T = CT +GT + κTV T + κNV N and Y N = CN +GN .
45When conducting the sensitivity analysis, we raise r from 52.4% to 78.2% for and τ from 4.2 to 13,
which correspond to the highest value in our sample of countries for the replacement rate and the firing
cost, respectively.
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Unlike, numerical results summarized in column 2 show that when calibrating to a
typical OECD economy, a model with labor market frictions can produce a decline in ω
and a less than proportional increase in the relative price as found in the data. To shed
light on the transmission mechanism of technical change biased toward the traded sector in
a model with labor market frictions, it is useful to numerically break down the responses
into two channels; i) a labor market frictions channel stemming from the effect of higher
productivity on hiring while keeping the trade balance fixed and ii) a labor accumulation
channel arising from the long-run rise in net exports.
As shown in the second line of panels C and D, a rise by 1% in the productivity of
tradables relative to non tradables raises the relative wage by 0.31% and appreciates the
relative price by 1.35% through the labor market frictions effect. Intuitively, a productivity
shock biased toward the traded sector increases traded output relative to non traded output,
thus requiring a rise in the relative price to clear the goods market. Because φ is smaller
than one, the relative price must appreciate more than proportionately which in turn raises
the share of non tradables into expenditure and thus encourages non traded firms to recruit
relatively more than traded firms. To attract workers who experience mobility costs when
shifting, the non traded wage must rise relative to the traded wage. As shown in the third
line of panels C and D, the labor accumulation effect counteracts the labor market frictions
effect. More specifically, technological change biased toward the traded sector also raises
net exports which has an expansionary effect on hiring in the traded sector, thus driving
down the relative wage by 0.49%. Higher demand for tradables also depreciates the relative
price by 0.52%. Importantly, the labor accumulation effect more than offsets the labor
market frictions effect so that the relative wage declines by 0.19% and the relative price
appreciates by 0.83%, as summarized in the first line of panels C and D.
Our model with search in the labor market and an endogenous labor force participa-
tion sheds light on two sets of factors influencing the mobility of labor across sectors and
thus the relative wage response to a productivity differential: the workers’ mobility cost
reflected by a utility loss when increasing the search intensity for a job in one sector (as
captured by σL) and labor market institutions determining the elasticity of hiring to labor
productivity (as captured by r and τ). While columns 3 to 5 explore the consequences of
the workers’ mobility cost, columns 6 to 8 investigate the implications of stringent labor
market regulation.
As we move from column 3 to column 5, the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive
margin σL is raised from zero to 1 so that the workers’ utility loss decline. Column 3 of
panels C and D of Table 5 shows numerical results if labor is totally immobile across sectors
as captured by setting σL = 0. In this configuration, the labor force is fixed in both sectors
because the mobility cost is prohibitive. Since the decision of search is inelastic to the
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sectoral wage, the relative wage falls by 0.48% instead of 0.19% in the baseline scenario.
Hence, such a polar case tends to substantially overstate the decline in the relative wage and
thus confirms the pivotal role of an endogenous labor force participation decision. Columns
4 and 5 of panels C and D of Table 5 analyze the effect of raising the elasticity the labor
supply at the extensive margin from 0.2 to 1. Because the utility loss induced by the shift
from one sector to another is lowered, the decline in the relative wage is moderated, as
shown in the first line of panel C. Because the shift of labor from the non traded to the
traded sector is increased, traded output rises more relative to non traded output, thus
raising the appreciation in the relative price from 0.81% to 0.87%, as displayed in the first
line of panel D.
Scenarios summarized in columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 show that raising the worker
bargaining power αW or the unemployment benefit replacement rate r amplifies the decline
in the relative wage from 0.19% to 0.23% and 0.28%, respectively. In accordance with
our model’s predictions, in countries with a higher worker bargaining power or providing
more generous unemployment benefits, technological change biased toward the traded sector
lowers more the relative wage through the labor accumulation effect, as shown in the third
line of panel C. The reason is that the elasticity of hiring to technological change is higher
since the labor market tightness is initially low in both sectors. Hence, job vacancies increase
substantially following a productivity shock. Higher recruiting expenditure produce larger
current account deficits along the transitional paths. Hence, net exports must rise more
for the intertemporal solvency condition to hold, thus resulting in a greater expansionary
effect on labor demand in the traded sector and thereby on traded wages. The stronger
labor accumulation effect also moderates the appreciation in the relative price from 0.83%
to 0.78% and 0.73%, as shown in the first line of panel D, because the demand for tradables
increases more than in the baseline scenario. The second line of panel C also reveals that the
relative wage increases less than in the baseline scenario through the labor market frictions
effect. Intuitively, raising the worker bargaining power or the replacement rate increase the
mobility of labor across sectors by raising the marginal benefit of search and reducing the
recruiting cost, respectively.
Column 8 of Table 5 gives results when the firing cost is about about three times larger
than in the baseline scenario. In accordance with our empirical findings, raising the firing
cost drives down further the relative wage from -0.19% to -0.21%. As shown in the third
line of panel C, the labor accumulation channel is merely affected by the firing cost. On the
contrary, the second line of panel C reveals that the relative wage increases by a smaller
amount because the firing cost curbs the expansionary effect of technological change on
hiring by non traded firms and thus moderates the rise in the non traded wage from 0.31%
to 0.27%. Moreover, as shown in the first line of panel D, countries with stringent legal
protection against dismissals also experience a larger appreciation in the relative price of
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non tradables because traded output increases more relative to non traded output.
The latter two columns of Table 5 compare the relative wage and relative price effects of
technological change biased toward the traded sector between a typical European country
and the US. Because the legal protection against dismissals is stricter while unemployment
benefits are higher, a typical European economy experiences a smaller increase in the non
traded wage through the labor market frictions channel and a larger increase in the traded
wage through the labor accumulation channel. As a result, the relative wage falls by 0.22%
in EU-12 and declines by only 10% in the US. While a higher firing cost tends to amplify the
appreciation in the relative price, a larger replacement rate tends to moderate it. The first
line of panel D shows that the latter effect dominates so that a productivity differential
raises the relative price of non tradables more in the US (0.89%) than in a European
economy (0.79%).
We briefly discuss the scenario of an elasticity of substitution between traded and on
traded goods larger than one. Panels E and F of Table 5 report the relative wage and
relative price long-run responses to a productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables of 1%. Because the labor accumulation channel reinforces the labor market fric-
tions channel, the first line of panel E reveals that the model tends to overstate the decline
in the relative wage when φ > 1. Because in this configuration, a productivity differential of
1% appreciates the relative price less than proportionately through the labor labor market
frictions effect while the rise in net exports depreciates p, the model tends to understate
the rise in p, as shown in the first line of panel F.
Finally, we explore the relative wage and relative price effects when the elasticity of
substitution between tradables and non tradables is set to one. This case is shown in
panel A and panel B of Table 5. Keeping fixed net exports, higher productivity growth
in tradables relative to non tradables would have no effect on the relative wage while the
relative price would appreciate by 1% if labor market parameters were identical because
the share of tradables in total expenditure remains unchanged. As shown in the second
line of panel A, the relative wage falls very slightly though because the elasticity of hiring
in the traded sector is merely higher than that in the non traded sector. The third line
of panel A and B reveals that technological change biased toward the traded sector lowers
substantially the relative wage and produces an appreciation in the relative price close to
our estimates due to the improvement in the balance of trade. Alternative scenarios yield
similar results to those discussed above and therefore do not merit further comment.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 5 about here >
———————————————————————-
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5.3 Taking the Model to the Data
We now move a step further and compare the predicted values with estimates for each
country and the whole sample. To do so, we use the same baseline calibration for each
country, except for the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non-traded goods,
and labor market parameters which are allowed to vary across countries. More specifically,
the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non traded goods is set in accordance
with its estimates shown in the first column of Table 6. The parameters which capture the
degree of labor market regulation such as the firing cost x, and the replacement rate r are
set to their values shown in the latter two columns of Table 9. The job destruction rate sj ,
and the matching efficiency Xj in sector j are set to target the unemployment rate uj and
the job finding rate mj summarized in columns (2), (3), and in columns (5), (7) of Table
9. The costs per job vacancy κT and κN are chosen to target the aggregate labor market
tightness θ shown in column (13) and the ratio of sectoral labor market tightness θT /θN
obtained by dividing column (10) by column (11).46
Results are shown in Table 6. Columns 2 and 5 of Table 6 give the predicted responses of
ωˆ and pˆ to a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables by 1%. Columns
3 and 6 report fully modified OLS estimates of ωˆ and pˆ for each country and the whole
sample.47 Columns 4 and 7 gives the difference between the actual and the predicted value.
The prediction error averages 0.106 for the relative wage and 0.150 for the relative price.
Column 4 reveals that our model’s predictions for ωˆ are relatively close to the evidence for
half of the countries in our sample, including Australia, Germany, France, the UK, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the US; for these economies, the prediction
error is smaller than average. When calibrating to the whole sample, the model predicts
fairly well the relative wage response to a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity
differential; more precisely, we find numerically a decline in the relative wage of 0.267%
while in the data, ω falls by 0.223%. Inspection of the prediction error in column 4 of Table
6 reveals that our model tends to overstate the decline in the relative wage for two third of
the 18 economies and the whole sample as well. This result suggests that an elasticity of
46Ideally, the recruiting cost κj would be set in order to target θj ; however, the series for job vacancies by
economic activity are available for a maximum of seven years. On the contrary, the OECD provides data for
job openings (for the whole economy) over the period 1980-2007 allowing us to calculate the labor market
tightness, i.e., θ = V/U , for several countries that we target along with the ratio θT /θN by choosing κT and
κN . When data for sectoral labor market tightness are not available, we target the average value θT /θN for
EU-12 if the country is a member of the European Economic Area, the average value for the US (Australia),
and average value for the OECD otherwise. When data for job openings are not available at an aggregate
level, we first calibrate the model to EU-12 (US, OECD), in particular choosing κT and κN to target an
aggregate labor market tightness θ of 0.12 (0.59, 0.18) and a ratio θT /θN of 0.75 (0.66, 0.77); then, we set
κT and κN chosen for EU-12 if the country is a member of the European Economic Area, chosen for the
US for Canada, and chosen for the OECD otherwise. Finally, because labor market parameters cannot be
calculated at a sectoral level for France, the Netherlands, Norway and Korea (only sectoral unemployment
rates are available for Korea), we assume that the job destruction rate s and the matching efficiency X are
identical across sectors and are chosen so as to target u and m shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9.
47FMOLS and DOLS cointegration procedures give very similar estimates. Since the model has been
calibrated by using FMOLS estimates of φ, we compare predicted values with FMOLS estimates. We reach
similar conclusions when using DOLS estimates.
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labor supply at the extensive margin σL of 0.5, although in line with estimates documented
by empirical studies, may be too low, thus leading the model to overstate the workers’
mobility cost.
While the prediction error is larger than for the relative wage in average, the model
predicts fairly well the relative price response for half countries of our sample, including
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the
US. The prediction error is also lower than average in Denmark, Ireland and Italy. It is
worthwhile mentioning that that the prediction error is large for Australia, Canada, and
Norway which are important natural resources exporters. Hence, for these three economies,
we believe that our assumption of given terms of trade is too strong. Turning to the whole
sample, a rise in productivity of tradables relative to non tradables of 1% produces a rise
in the relative price by 0.745% while we find empirically an elasticity of 0.636.
———————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 6 about here >
———————————————————————-
6 Conclusion
While the literature exploring the implications of technological change biased toward the
traded sector commonly assume frictionless labor markets, our empirical results show that
the non traded wage tends to decline relative to the traded wage. More specifically, using
a sample of eighteen OECD countries over the period 1970-2007, we find that a rise in the
productivity of tradables relative to non tradables by 1% lowers the relative wage of non
tradables by 0.22%. Because the the non traded wage increases at a lower speed than the
traded wage, it is found empirically that the relative price of non tradables appreciates
by 0.64% only instead of 1% as predicted by the standard neoclassical model abstracting
from labor market frictions. When estimating the relative wage response by country, we
conjecture that the large cross-country variations found in the data is the result of labor
market institutions. In accordance with our interpretation, using a set of three indicators,
our findings reveal that countries with stringent legal protection against dismissals, a more
generous unemployment benefit scheme, or a higher bargaining coverage experience a sig-
nificant larger decline in the relative wage following higher productivity in tradables relative
to non tradables.
To account for the evidence, we develop a two-sector open economy model with search
in the labor market and an endogenous labor force participation decision. We find analyt-
ically that two sets of parameters play a pivotal role in the determination of the relative
wage response to technological change biased toward the traded sector: i) preference pa-
rameters such as the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin and the elasticity of
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substitution in consumption between tradables and non tradables, ii) parameters capturing
the ’rigidities’ in the labor market such as the firing tax, the unemployment benefit replace-
ment rate and the worker bargaining power. Our quantitative analysis indicates that higher
productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables lowers the relative wage across
all scenarios as long as the elasticity of labor supply that measures the workers’ mobility
cost takes a finite value. On the contrary, the situations of total immobility or perfect mo-
bility of labor across sectors that emerge as special cases cannot account for the evidence.
Importantly, the relative wage falls by a larger amount when raising the replacement rate
or the worker bargaining power because traded firms are encouraged to hire more, thus
amplifying the rise in the traded wage. Increasing the firing cost curbs hiring in the non
traded sector, and thus produces a larger decline in the relative wage, in accordance with
our evidence.
The final exercise we perform is to compare the responses of the relative price and
relative wage for each OECD economy in our sample to our empirical estimates. To do
so, we estimate the elasticity of substitution in consumption between tradables and non
tradables and the labor market parameters for each country. Allowing these two sets of
pivotal parameters to vary across countries, it is found that the model predicts the relative
wage growth fairly well and to a lesser extent the elasticity of the relative price to relative
productivity.
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Figure 1: The Relative Price and the Relative Wage Growth. Notes: Figure plots the
annual average growth of the relative price of non tradables and the relative wage of non
tradables, both scaled by the average productivity growth differential between tradables
and non tradables, for each country of our sample over 1970-2007.
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests (p-values)
Test Stat Variables
ω p aT − aN p− (aT − aN )
Levin et al. [2002] t-stat 0.075 0.376 0.998 0.510
Breitung [2000] t-stat 0.273 0.667 0.760 0.124
Im et al. [2003] W-stat 0.558 1.000 1.000 0.999
Maddala and Wu [1999] ADF 0.329 0.972 1.000 0.950
PP 0.289 0.953 0.999 0.983
Hadri [2000] Zµ-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: For all tests, except for Hadri [2000], the null of a unit root is not rejected if p-value
≥ 0.05 at a 5% significance level. For Hadri [2000], the null of stationarity is rejected if
p-value ≤ 0.05 at a 5% significance level.
Table 2: Panel Cointegration Estimates of β and γ for the Whole Sample (eqs. (7))
Relative wage eq. (7a) Relative price eq. (7b)
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS
(aT − aN ) −0.2a
(−29.72)
−0.223a
(−33.85)
0.646a
(76.543)
0.636a
(83.01)
t(β) = 0 0.000 0.000
t(γ) = 1 0.000 0.000
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Number of observations 680 680 680 680
Notes: all regressions include country fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a denotes significance at 1% level. The
rows t(β) = 0 and t(γ) = 1 report the p-value of the test of H0 : β = 0 and H0 : γ = 1
respectively.
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Table 3: Panel Cointegration Estimates of βi and γi for Each Country (eqs. (7))
Relative wage equation Relative price equation
Country βˆDOLSi βˆ
FMOLS
i γˆ
DOLS
i γˆ
FMOLS
i
AUS −0.047
(−1.51)
−0.062b
(−2.19)
0.567a
(10.95)
0.559a
(10.88)
AUT −0.220a
(−12.62)
−0.231a
(−13.95)
0.687a
(20.14)
0.689a
(21.89)
BEL −0.150a
(−6.36)
−0.135a
(−5.74)
0.732a
(17.49)
0.740a
(17.52)
CAN −0.298a
(−6.11)
−0.299a
(−7.19)
0.549a
(4.95)
0.524a
(5.19)
DEU −0.502a
(−20.60)
−0.493a
(−22.90)
0.532a
(9.76)
0.517a
(10.70)
DNK −0.366a
(−4.96)
−0.355a
(−5.86)
0.361a
(9.51)
0.357a
(12.63)
ESP −0.231a
(−8.30)
−0.236a
(−11.10)
0.689a
(19.14)
0.709a
(21.50)
FIN −0.197a
(−11.14)
−0.193a
(−12.99)
0.645a
(19.98)
0.628a
(23.02)
FRA −0.396a
(−6.56)
−0.395a
(−7.00)
0.787a
(29.79)
0.790a
(31.01)
GBR −0.152b
(−2.35)
−0.161a
(−2.94)
0.842a
(6.63)
0.810a
(7.41)
IRL −0.187a
(−3.64)
−0.193a
(−4.20)
0.554a
(18.09)
0.562a
(19.20)
ITA −0.265a
(−10.04)
−0.282a
(−11.74)
0.761a
(23.91)
0.727a
(23.34)
JPN −0.161a
(−8.05)
−0.157a
(−9.29)
0.879a
(42.50)
0.898a
(41.06)
KOR −0.403a
(−10.77)
−0.393a
(−12.53)
0.529a
(40.46)
0.532a
(45.58)
NLD −0.331a
(−5.90)
−0.307a
(−5.82)
0.724a
(15.95)
0.731a
(18.04)
NOR −0.071a
(−5.84)
−0.081a
(−6.17)
0.094
(0.75)
0.034
(0.29)
SWE −0.020
(−0.66)
−0.009
(−0.52)
0.908a
(11.23)
0.882a
(18.13)
USA −0.017
(−0.69)
−0.033
(−1.47)
0.784a
(23.50)
0.765a
(24.80)
UE-12 −0.252a
(−26.89)
−0.249a
(−30.24)
0.685a
(58.20)
0.679a
(64.78)
All sample −0.223a
(−29.72)
−0.223a
(−33.85)
0.646a
(76.543)
0.636a
(83.01)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
Table 4: Panel Cointegration Estimates of β for subsamples (eq. (8))
LMR r EPLadj BargCov LMR
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS
high LMR −0.261a
(−23.04)
−0.255a
(−25.65)
−0.165a
(−30.29)
−0.172a
(−32.59)
−0.242a
(−22.18)
−0.238a
(−24.91)
−0.166a
(−31.68)
−0.173a
(−33.20)
low LMR −0.158a
(−16.34)
−0.166a
(−19.14)
−0.130a
(−13.97)
−0.130a
(−11.57)
−0.180a
(−17.25)
−0.185a
(−19.93)
−0.113a
(−10.74)
−0.112a
(−8.26)
t(βˆlow = βˆhigh) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
Time period 1970-2007 1985-2007 1970-2007 1985-2007
Countries 17 18 17 17
Observations 642 414 642 390
mean LMR (high) 0.609 2.280 0.864 1.376
mean LMR (low) 0.389 1.296 0.448 -0.578
Notes: a denotes significance at 1% level. The row t(βˆlow = βˆhigh) reports the p-value of the test of H0 : βˆlow = βˆhigh. r is the
unemployment benefits replacement rate, EPL the strictness of employment protection against dismissals, BargCov the bargaining
coverage and LMR the labor market regulation index obtained by using a principal component analysis.
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(c) Relative Wage Responses against Worker
Bargaining Power
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(d) Relative Wage Responses against Labor
Market Regulation Index
Figure 2: Labor Market Regulation and The Relative Wage Response to Technological
Change Biased toward the Traded Sector Notes: Figure plots fully modified OLS estimates
of relative wage responses to a labor productivity differential against indicators of labor
market regulation. FMOLS estimates for each country are taken from Table 3. Firing
cost is captured by the employment protection legislation index adjusted with the share
of permanent workers in the economy (source: OECD); the generosity of unemployment
benefit scheme is measured by average of net unemployment benefit replacement rates for
three duration of unemployment (source: OECD); the worker bargaining power is measured
by the bargaining coverage (source: Visser [2009]); in Figure 2(d), we recourse to a principal
component analysis in order to have one overall indicator encompassing the three dimensions
of labor market regulation.
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Table 6: Comparison of Predicted Values with Empirical Estimates
Country Parameter Relative wage response Relative price response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Substitutability φ ωˆpredict ωˆFMOLS (3)-(2) pˆpredict pˆFMOLS (6)-(5)
AUS 0.295 0.042 -0.062 -0.104 1.040 0.559 -0.481
AUT 1.019 -0.363 -0.231 0.132 0.664 0.689 0.025
BEL 0.749 -0.332 -0.135 0.197 0.685 0.740 0.055
CAN 0.439 -0.08 -0.299 -0.219 0.925 0.524 -0.401
DEU 1.126 -0.438 -0.493 -0.055 0.557 0.517 -0.04
DNK 1.925 -0.536 -0.355 0.181 0.463 0.357 -0.106
ESP 0.782 -0.348 -0.236 0.112 0.694 0.709 0.015
FIN 1.043 -0.417 -0.193 0.224 0.593 0.628 0.035
FRA 0.896 -0.376 -0.395 -0.019 0.628 0.790 0.162
GBR 0.477 -0.102 -0.161 -0.059 0.902 0.810 -0.092
IRL 0.321 -0.264 -0.193 0.071 0.734 0.562 -0.172
ITA - -0.278 -0.282 -0.004 0.723 0.727 0.004
JPN 0.713 -0.200 -0.157 0.043 0.812 0.898 0.086
KOR 2.914 -0.687 -0.393 0.294 0.368 0.532 0.164
NLD 0.644 -0.318 -0.307 0.011 0.672 0.731 0.059
NOR 1.004 -0.292 -0.081 0.211 0.704 0.034 -0.67
SWE 0.329 -0.008 -0.009 -0.001 1.015 0.882 -0.133
USA 0.699 -0.144 -0.033 0.111 0.841 0.765 -0.076
UE-12 0.599 -0.215 -0.249 -0.034 0.798 0.679 -0.119
Whole sample 0.800 -0.267 -0.223 0.044 0.745 0.636 -0.109
Notes: φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non
traded goods. We denote by superscripts “predict” and “FMOLS” the numerically com-
puted values and fully modified OLS estimates taken from Table 3, respectively; columns
(4) and (7) show the difference between FMOLS estimates and predicted values for per-
centage changes in the relative wage and the relative price of non tradables.
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A Data for Empirical Analysis
Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 18 countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT),
Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN),
France (FRA), the United Kingdom (GBR), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR),
the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), and the United States (USA). The period
is running from 1970 to 2007, except for Japan (1974-2007).
Sources: We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database (the March 2011 data release) for all countries
of our sample with the exceptions of Canada and Norway. For these two countries, sectoral data
are taken from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database provided by the OECD [?]. Both the
EU KLEMS and STAN databases provide annual data at the ISIC-rev.3 1-digit level for eleven
industries.
The eleven industries are split into tradables and non tradables sectors. To do so, we adopt
the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994]. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we
have updated this classification by treating ”Financial Intermediation” as a traded industry. We
construct traded and non traded sectors as follows (EU KLEMS codes are given in parentheses):
• Traded Sector: ”Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing” (AtB), ”Mining and Quar-
rying” (C), ”Total Manufacturing” (D), ”Transport, Storage and Communication” (I) and
”Financial Intermediation” (J).
• Non Traded Sector: ”Electricity, Gas and Water Supply” (E), ”Construction” (F), ”Whole-
sale and Retail Trade” (G), ”Hotels and Restaurants” (H), ”Real Estate, Renting and Business
Services” (K) and ”Community Social and Personal Services” (LtQ).
Once industries have been classified as traded or non traded, for any macroeconomic variable
X, its sectoral counterpart Xj for j = T,N is constructed by adding the Xk of all sub-industries k
classified in sector j = T,N as follows Xj =
∑
k∈j Xk. In the following, we provide details on data
construction (mnemonics are in parentheses):
• Relative wage of non tradables, Ω, is calculated as the ratio of the nominal wage in the
non traded sector WN to the nominal wage in the traded sector WT , i.e., Ω =WN/WT . The
sectoral nominal wage W j for sector j = T,N is calculated by dividing labor compensation
in sector j (LAB) by total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector.
• Relative price of non tradables, P , corresponds to the ratio of the value added deflator of
non traded goods PN to the value added deflator of traded goods PT , i.e., P = PN/PT . The
sectoral value-added deflator P j for sector j = T,N is calculated by dividing value added at
current prices by value added at constant prices in sector j. Series for sectoral value added
at current prices (VA) (constant prices (VA QI) resp.) are constructed by adding value at
current (constant resp.) prices of all sub-industries in sector j = T,N .
• Relative productivity of tradables, AT /AN , is calculated as the ratio of traded real
labor productivity AT to the non traded real labor productivity AN . To measure real labor
productivity in sector j = T,N , we divide value-added at constant prices in sector j (VA QI)
by total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector.
To empirically assess the role of labor market regulation in the determination of the relative price
and relative wage responses to higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables, we
use a number of indicators which capture the extent of rigidity of labor markets. We detail below
the sources:
• Employment protection legislation, denoted by EPLit in country i at time t, is an index
available on an annual basis developed by the OECD which is designed as a multi-dimensional
indicator of the strictness of a comprehensive set of legal regulations governing hiring and
firing employees on regular contracts. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics database.
Data coverage: 1985-2007 (1990-2007 for KOR). Because the legal protection for workers
with temporary contracts has been eased in most European countries, we follow Boeri and
Van Ours [2006] and construct an alternative index in order to have a more accurate measure
of employment protection. This indicator, denoted by EPLadjit in country i at time t, is
computed by adjusting EPL with the share of permanent workers in the economy (shareperm)
according to EPLadj = EPL × shareperm. Source for shareperm: OECD Labour Market
Statistics database. Data coverage: 1985-2007 (1990-2007 for KOR).
• The generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme, rit in country i at time t, is commonly
captured by the unemployment benefit replacement rate. the replacement rate measure
is defined as the average of the net unemployment benefit (including social assistance and
housing benefit) replacement rates for two earnings levels and three family situations. Source:
OECD, Benefits and Wages Database. Data coverage: 2001-2007. In order to have longer time
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series, we calculated r over the period running from 1970 to 2000, by using the growth rate
of the historic OECD measure of benefit entitlements which is defined as the average of the
gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations
and three durations of unemployment. Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database. Data
coverage: 1970-2001 for all countries while data are unavailable for Korea.
• The worker bargaining power is measured by the collective bargaining coverage, BargCovit,
which corresponds to the employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreements as a
proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining. Source:
Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention
and Social Pacts, 1960-2009 (ICTWSS), version 3.0, Jelle Visser [2009]. Data coverage: 1970-
2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU, DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA, 1970-2005
for NLD and NOR, 1970-2002 for BEL and FRA, 1977-2004 for ESP and 2002-2006 for KOR.
B Data for Calibration
B.1 Non Tradable Share
Table 7 shows the non-tradable content of labor, consumption, government spending, and gives the
share of government spending on the traded and non traded goods in the sectoral output. The
last column of Table 7 also shows the ratio of traded real labor productivity to the non traded real
labor productivity, AT /AN . Our sample consists of 18 OECD countries mentioned in section A,
including 12 European countries plus Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, Norway, the United-States.
Our reference period for the calibration corresponds to the period 1990-2007. The choice of this
period has been dictated by data availability.
To calculate the non-tradable share of employment we split the eleven industries into traded and
non-traded sectors by adopting the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994] and updated
by Jensen and Kletzer [2006] (Source: EU KLEMS [2011]). The non-tradable share of labor, shown
in column 1 of Table 7 averages to 66%.
To split consumption expenditure (at current prices) into consumption in traded and non traded
goods, we made use of the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) published
by the United Nations (Source: United Nations [2011]). Among the twelve items, the following
ones are treated as consumption in traded goods: ”Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages”, ”Alcoholic
Beverages Tobacco and Narcotics”, ”Clothing and Footwear”, ”Furnishings, Household Equipment”,
”Transport”, ”Miscellaneous Goods and Services”. The remaining items are treated as consumption
in non traded goods: ”Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Fuels”, ”Health”, ”Communication”,
”Education”, ”Restaurants and Hotels”. Because the item ”Recreation and Culture” is somewhat
problematic, we decided to consider it as both tradable (50%) and non tradable (50%) with equal
shares. Data coverage: 1990-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DNK, FIN, FRA, GBR, ITA, JPN, KOR,
NLD, NOR, and USA, 1991-2007 for DEU, 1993-2007 for SWE, 1995-2007 for BEL and ESP and
1996-2007 for IRL. Note that the non-tradable share of consumption shown in column 2 of Table 7
averages to 42%, in line with the share reported by Stockman and Tesar [1995].
Sectoral government expenditure data (at current prices) were obtained from the Government
Finance Statistics Yearbook (Source: IMF [2011]) and the OECD General Government Accounts
database (Source: OECD [2011b]). Adopting Morshed and Turnovsky’s [2004] methodology, the
following four items were treated as traded: ”Fuel and Energy”, ”Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and
Hunting”, ”Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction”, ”Transport and Communications”. Items
treated as non traded are: ”Government Public Services”, ”Defense”, ”Public Order and Safety”,
”Education”, ”Health”, ”Social Security and Welfare”, ”Environment Protection”, ”Housing and
Community Amenities”, ”Recreation Cultural and Community Affairs”. Data coverage: 1990-2007
for BEL, DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, NOR and USA, 1990-2006 for CAN, 1991-2007 for DEU,
1995-2007 for AUT, ESP, FRA, NLD and SWE and 2000-2007 for KOR (data are not available for
AUS). The non-tradable component of government spending shown in column 3 of Table 7 averages
to 90%. The proportion of government spending on the traded and non traded good (i.e., GT /Y T
and GN/Y N ) are shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 7. They average 5% and 29%, respectively.
B.2 Elasticity of Substitution in consumption (φ)
To estimate the elasticity of substitution in consumption φ between traded and non traded goods,
we first derive a testable equation by inserting the optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of con-
sumption (13) into the goods market equilibrium which gives C
T
CN
= Y
T−NX−GT−IT
Y N−GN−IN =
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
Pφ
where NX ≡ B˙ − r?B is net exports, Ij and Gj are investment in physical capital and govern-
ment spending in sector j, respectively. Isolating
(
Y T −NX) /Y N and taking logarithm yields
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ln
(
Y T−NX
Y N
)
= α + φp where α is a term composed of (logged) ratios of GT (GN ) and IT (IN )
to Y T − NX (Y N ), and of a preference parameter ϕ. Adding an error term µ, we estimate φ by
running the regression of the (logged) output of tradables adjusted with net exports at constant
prices in terms of output of non tradables on the (logged) relative price of non tradables:
ln
(
Y T −NX
Y N
)
i,t
= fi + ft + αit+ φi lnPi,t + µi,t, (54)
where fi and ft are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively. Because the term α
is composed of ratios and hence may display a trend over time, we add country-specific trends, as
captured by αit.
Instead of using time series for sectoral value added, we can alternatively make use of series for
sectoral labor compensation. Multiplying both sides of (
Y T−NX)(1−υGT−υV T )
Y N(1−υGN−υVN )
=
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
Pφ by P
T
PN
and then by ωT /ωN with ωj = W
jLj
P jY j , denoting by γ
T =
(
WTLT − ωTPTNX) (with ωT ≡ WTLTPTY T )
and γN =WNLN , and taking logarithm yields ln
(
γT
γN
)
= η+φ lnP where η is a term composed of
both preference (i.e., ϕ) and production (i.e., θj) parameters, and (logged) ratios of GT (GN ) and
IT (IN ) to WTLT − ωTPTNX (WNLN ). We estimate φ by exploring alternatively the following
empirical relationship:
ln
(
γT /γN
)
i,t
= gi + gt + ηit+ φi lnPi,t + ζi,t, (55)
where gi and gt are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively, and we add country-
specific trends, as captured by ηit, because η is composed of ratios that may display a trend over
time.
Time series for sectoral value added at constant prices, labor compensation, and the relative
price of non tradables are taken from EU KLEMS [2011] (see section A). Net exports correspond to
the external balance of goods and services at current prices taken from OECD Economic Outlook
Database. To construct time series for net exports at constant prices NX, data are deflated by the
traded value added deflator of traded goods PTt .
Since the LHS term of (54) and the relative price of non tradables display trends, we ran unit root
and then cointegration tests. Having verified that these two assumptions are empirically supported,
we estimate the cointegrating relationships by using fully modified OLS (FMOLS) procedure for
cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000], [2001]. FMOLS estimates are reported in the second
and the third column of Table 8, considering eq. (54). Estimates of φ are reported in column 2 of
Table 8 when calibrating the model for each country. As a reference model, we consider eq. (54);
exploring the empirical relationship (54) gives an estimate for the whole sample of 0.800 which is
smaller than one, in line with estimates documented by cross-section studies, notably Stockman and
Tesar [1995] who find a value for φ of 0.44 and Mendoza [1995] who reports an estimate of 0.74. As
shown in column 2 of Table 8, estimate of φ for Belgium is not statistically significant and thus we
take consistent estimate obtained when exploring the empirical relationship (55) for this economy.
Because estimates for Italy is negative by using alternatively eq. (54) or eq. (55), estimate for φ
for this country is left blank and φ is set to our panel data estimation for EU-12, i.e., 0.599, when
calibrating the model for each country.
C Data for Calibration: Labor Market
We now describe the data employed to calibrate the model, focusing on labor market. We use two
calibrations aimed at capturing the the U.S. and European labor markets.
• Sectoral unemployment rate denoted by uj (j = T,N): Sectoral unemployment rate is the
number of unemployed workers U j in sector j as share of the labor force F j ≡ Lj + U j
in this sector, in %. LABORSTA database from ILO provides series for unemployed workers
by economic activity for fourteen OECD countries over eighteen of our sample. The longest
available period ranges from 1987 to 2007. On average, our data covers 12.5 years per country.
Series cover 18 sectors, according to ISIC Rev.3 classification.
Sectors have been aggregated into tradables (Agriculture; Hunting and Forestry; Fishing;
Mining and Quarrying; Manufacturing; Transport, Storage and Communications; Financial
Intermediation) and non-tradables (Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Construction; Whole-
sale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles and Personal and Household
Goods; Hotels and Restaurants; Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities; Public Ad-
ministration and Defense, Compulsory Social Security; Education; Health and Social Work;
Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities; Households with Employed Per-
sons; Extra-Territorial Organizations and Bodies). Note that unemployment in the following
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Table 7: Data to Calibrate the Two-Sector Model (1990-2007)
Countries Non tradable Share Gj/Y j Relative Productivity
Labor Consumption Gov. Spending G/Y GT /Y T GN/Y N AT /AN
AUS 0.68 0.43 n.a. 0.18 n.a. n.a. 1.30
AUT 0.64 0.42 0.90 0.19 0.05 0.27 1.05
BEL 0.68 0.42 0.91 0.22 0.06 0.30 1.28
CAN 0.69 0.43 0.91 0.20 0.05 0.30 1.32
DEU 0.65 0.40 0.91 0.19 0.05 0.27 1.00
DNK 0.68 0.42 0.94 0.26 0.05 0.36 1.17
ESP 0.66 0.46 0.88 0.18 0.06 0.24 1.18
FIN 0.63 0.43 0.89 0.22 0.06 0.34 1.47
FRA 0.69 0.40 0.94 0.23 0.05 0.31 1.05
GBR 0.70 0.40 0.93 0.20 0.04 0.29 1.54
IRL 0.62 0.43 0.89 0.17 0.04 0.28 1.83
ITA 0.63 0.37 0.91 0.19 0.05 0.27 1.00
JPN 0.64 0.43 0.86 0.16 0.06 0.22 0.96
KOR 0.58 0.44 0.76 0.12 0.06 0.18 1.53
NLD 0.70 0.40 0.90 0.23 0.07 0.32 1.38
NOR 0.66 0.39 0.88 0.21 0.06 0.34 1.44
SWE 0.68 0.45 0.92 0.27 0.06 0.39 1.42
USA 0.73 0.51 0.90 0.16 0.05 0.20 1.12
Mean 0.66 0.42 0.90 0.20 0.05 0.29 1.28
Notes: Gj/Y j is the share of government spending in good j in output of sector j
Table 8: Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution in Consumption between Tradables and
Non Tradables (φ)
Country φˆDOLSi φˆ
FMOLS
i φˆ
DOLS
i φˆ
FMOLS
i
eq. (54) eq. (54) eq. (55) eq. (55)
AUS 0.081
(0.74)
0.295a
(3.09)
0.011
(0.08)
0.375b
(2.39)
AUT 0.574
(1.62)
1.019a
(2.99)
0.910a
(3.77)
1.414a
(4.98)
BEL −0.268
(−1.58)
0.034
(0.17)
0.393a
(3.41)
0.749a
(4.60)
CAN 0.308b
(2.04)
0.439a
(3.75)
0.332b
(2.18)
0.569a
(4.94)
DEU 0.976a
(3.46)
1.126a
(2.99)
1.190a
(4.34)
1.363a
(3.47)
DNK 1.243
(1.24)
1.925a
(2.76)
1.698b
(2.35)
1.320a
(2.73)
ESP 0.527a
(3.31)
0.782a
(4.71)
0.177
(0.90)
0.355c
(1.71)
FIN 1.556a
(10.13)
1.043a
(9.30)
2.061a
(8.62)
1.412a
(8.45)
FRA 0.880a
(4.75)
0.896a
(6.29)
1.169a
(4.46)
1.048a
(5.58)
GBR 0.688a
(8.76)
0.477a
(9.57)
1.424a
(14.39)
1.183a
(15.03)
IRL 0.074
(0.28)
0.321
(1.48)
0.485
(0.89)
0.126
(0.28)
ITA −0.365a
(−3.44)
−0.260
(−1.50)
−0.427a
(−3.04)
−0.206
(−1.17)
JPN 0.832a
(3.96)
0.713a
(3.25)
0.681a
(4.52)
0.655a
(4.55)
KOR 0.626
(0.52)
2.914a
(4.16)
1.006
(1.26)
2.237a
(4.60)
NLD 0.832a
(2.65)
0.644c
(1.93)
0.523c
(1.92)
0.412
(1.10)
NOR 1.138a
(7.26)
1.004a
(9.81)
2.080a
(14.42)
2.056a
(13.51)
SWE 0.364b
(2.24)
0.329a
(3.52)
1.073a
(5.85)
0.915a
(7.16)
USA 0.486
(1.37)
0.699a
(3.27)
0.571
(0.90)
0.804b
(2.07)
EU-12 0.590a
(9.65)
0.599a
(11.84)
0.890a
(26.17)
0.832a
(16.18)
Whole sample 0.586a
(11.63)
0.800a
(16.86)
0.853a
(24.52)
0.933a
(28.55)
Notes: Data coverage: 1970-2007 (except Japan: 1974-2007). All re-
gressions include country fixed effects, time dummies and country spe-
cific trends. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% lev-
els. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
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categories, ’Not classifiable by economic activity’ and ’Unemployed seeking their first job’ has
been split between tradables and non-tradables according to the shares of total employment
between tradables and non-tradables, by year. Average EU-10 unemployment rate shown in
Table 9 is the unweighted sum of ten EU members’ unemployment rates. Source: LABORSTA
database from the International Labour Organization (ILO).
• Job finding rate denoted by mj (j = T,N): This parameter has been estimated at a sectoral
level by adopting the methodology proposed by Shimer [2012]. As Shimer [2012], we ignore
movements in and out of the overall labor force. Since we compute the job finding rate for
the traded and the non traded sector, we have to further assume that labor force is fixed at
a sectoral level, i.e., we ignore reallocation of labor across sectors. More details on the model
as well as the derivations of the results can be found below.
• Labor market tightness denoted by θj (j = T,N): This variable is calculated as employment
vacancies on the number of unemployed, by sector. While series for unemployed workers by
economic activity are taken from LABORSTA (ILO), series for job vacancies at a sectoral
level taken from various databases, as detailed below.
Once industries have been classified as traded or non traded, series for employment vacancies
are constructed by adding job openings of all sub-industries in sector j = T,N . The same
logic applies to calculate unemployed workers in sector j. The labor market tightness θj is
the ratio of job vacancies V j to unemployed workers U j in sector j.
θj =
∑Nj
i=1 V
j
i∑Nj
i=1 U
j
i
=
V j
U j
,
where i are industries classified in sector j and Nj is the number of industries in sector
j = T,N .
Eurostat provides series for continental European countries that cover 15 sectors, according
to NACE 1-digit classification. Sectors have been aggregated into tradables (Agriculture,
hunting and forestry; Financial intermediation; Fishing; Manufacturing; Mining and quar-
rying; Transport, storage and communication) and non tradables (Construction; Education;
Electricity, gas and water supply; Health and social work; Hotels and restaurants; Other com-
munity, social and personal service activities; Public administration and defense; Compulsory
social security; Real estate, renting and business activities; Wholesale and retail trade, repair
of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods). For continental European
countries, the longest available period ranges from 2002 to 2007.
BLS provides series for the US which cover 18 sectors according to industrial classification.
Sectors have been aggregated into tradables (Durable goods manufacturing; Finance and in-
surance; Information; Mining and logging; Nondurable goods manufacturing; Professional
and business services; Transportation, warehousing, and utilities) and non-tradables (Accom-
modation and food services; Arts, entertainment, and recreation; Construction; Educational
services; Federal Health care and social assistance; Other services; Real estate and rental and
leasing; Retail trade; State and local; Wholesale trade). For the US, the longest available
period ranges from 2002 to 2007.
OFS provides series for the UK that cover 19 sectors, according to SIC 2007 classification.
Sectors have been aggregated into tradables (Financial and insurance activities; Information
and communication; Manufacturing; Mining and quarrying; Transport and storage) and non
tradables (Accomodation and food service activities; Administrative and support service ac-
tivities; Arts, entertainment and recreation; Construction; Education; Electricity, gas, steam
and air conditioning supply; Human health and social work activities; Other service activities;
Public administration and defense; Compulsory social security; Real estate activities; Water
supply, sewerage, waste and remediation activities; Wholesale and retail trade; repair of mo-
tor vehicles and motor cycles). Note that the sector ”Professional, scientific and technical
activities” has been evenly split across tradables and non-tradables. For the UK, the longest
available period ranges from 1988 to 2007.
Source: Eurostat database for continental European countries, LABSTAT database from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for the US, Labour Market Statistics from the Office for
National Statistics for the UK.
• Unemployment benefit net replacement rate denoted by r: The net replacement rate measure
is defined as the average of the net unemployment benefit (including social assistance and
housing benefit) replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations. Average
EU-12 unemployment benefit replacement rate shown in Table 9 is the unweighted sum of
twelve EU members’ replacement rates. Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database.
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• Firing cost denoted by x: the last column of Table 9 is a measured of the strictness of legal
protection against dismissals captured by the firing tax x in our model; it is calculated as
the sum of the average advance notice and average severance payment after 4 and 20 years
of employment (Source: Aleksynska and Schindler [2011]); x is expressed in monthly salary
equivalents and is averaged over the period 1980-2005.
gives the severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment
redundancy. The period is running from 2006 to 2013. Source: Historical data, Doing Business
Database.
Coverage: Series of employment and unemployment by economic activity provided by ILO
are not available for France, the Netherlands, Norway; while such data are available for Korea,
unemployment by duration provided by the OECD is not available and thus makes impossible
the estimates of the monthly job finding and job destruction rates. For these four countries, we
proceeded as follows:
• Job finding rate denoted by m: Monthly job finding rates come from Hobijn and Sahin [2009]
who hgive average values for France (1975-204), the Netherlands (1983-2004), Norway (1983-
2004). For Korea, we average the job finding rates taken from Chang et al. [2004] over
1993-1994.
• Unemployment rate denoted by u: Unemployed (workers as share of the labor force), in %:
France (1975-204), Korea (1993-1994), the Netherlands (1983-2004), Norway (1983-2004).
• Job separation rate denoted by s: Monthly job job separation rates are computed so as to be
consistent with the steady-state unemployment rate given by u = ss+m .
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1
A Data Description
A.1 Data: Source and Construction
Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 18 countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT),
Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN),
France (FRA), the United Kingdom (GBR), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR),
the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), and the United States (USA). The period
is running from 1970 to 2007, except for Japan (1974-2007). These countries have the most extensive
coverage of variables of our interest.
Sources: We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database (the March 2011 data release) for all countries
of our sample with the exceptions of Canada and Norway. For these two countries, sectoral data
are taken from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database provided by the OECD [?]. Both the
EU KLEMS and STAN databases provide annual data at the ISIC-rev.3 1-digit level for eleven
industries.
The eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries are split into tradables and non tradables sectors. To do
so, we adopt the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994] who treat an industry as traded
when it exports at least 10% of its output. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we have updated
the classification suggested by De Gregorio et al. [1994] by treating ”Financial Intermediation” as
a traded industry. Jensen and Kletzer [2006] use the geographic concentration of service activities
within the United States to identify which service activities are traded domestically. The authors
classify activities that are traded domestically as potentially traded internationally. The idea is that
when a good or a service is traded, the production of the activity is concentrated in a particular
region to take advantage of economies of scale in production.
Jensen and Kletzer [2006] use the two-digit NAICS (North American Industrial Classification
System) to identify tradable and non tradable sectors. We map their classification into the NACE-
ISIC-rev.3 used by the EU KLEMS database. The mapping was clear for all sectors except for ”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services”. According to the EU KLEMS classification, the industry
labelled ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” is an aggregate of five sub-industries: ”Real
estate activities” (NACE code: 70), ”Renting of Machinery and Equipment” (71), ”Computer and
Related Activities” (72), ”Research and Development” (73) and ”Other Business Activities” (74).
While Jensen and Kletzer [2006] find that industries 70 and 71 can be classified as tradable, they do
not provide information for industries 72, 73 and 74. We decided to classify ”Real Estate, Renting
and Business Services” as non tradable but conduct a robustness check by contrasting our empirical
findings when ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” is non traded with those when ”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services” is traded.
Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing;
Mining and Quarrying; Total Manufacturing; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Financial
Intermediation.
Non Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply;
Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Real Estate, Renting and Busi-
ness Services; and Community Social and Personal Services.
Relevant to our work, the EU KLEMS and STAN database provides series, for each industry
and year, on value added at current and constant prices, permitting the derivation of sectoral
deflators of value added, as well as details on labor compensation and employment data, allowing
the construction of sectoral wage rates. We describe below the construction for the data employed
in Section 2 (mnemonics are given in parentheses):
- Sectoral value-added deflator P jt for j = T,N : value added at current prices (VA) over value
added at constant prices (VA QI) in sector j. Source: EU KLEMS database. The relative
price of non tradables Pt corresponds to the ratio of the value added deflator of non traded
goods to the value added deflator of traded goods: Pt = PNt /PTt .
- Sectoral labor Ljt for j = T,N : total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in sector j.
Source: EU KLEMS database.
- Sectoral nominal wage W jt for j = T,N : labor compensation in sector j (LAB) over total
hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector. Source: EU KLEMS database.
The relative wage, Ωt is calculated as the ratio of the nominal wage in the non traded sector
WN to the nominal wage in the traded sector: Ωt =WNt /WTt .
Summary statistics of the data used in the empirical analysis are displayed in Table 11. As shown
in the first three columns, all countries of our sample experience technological change biased toward
the traded sector, an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables and a decline in the ratio of
the non traded wage relative to the traded wage.
Because data source and construction are heterogenous across variables as a result of different
nomenclatures, Table 11 provides a summary of the classification adopted to split value added and
2
its demand components as well intro traded and non traded goods.
A.2 Data: Source and Construction
To empirically assess the role of labor market institutions in the determination of the relative wage
response to higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables, we use three indicators
aimed at capturing the stringency of labor market regulation. We detail below the construction and
the source of these three indicators:
• The difficulty of redundancy is measured by the employment protection legislation in-
dex, EPLit in country i at time t, provided by OECD which captures the strictness of legal
protection against dismissals for permanent workers. Source for EPLit: OECD Labour Mar-
ket Statistics database. Data coverage: 1985-2007 (1990-2007 for KOR). This index can be
misleading since regulation was eased for temporary contracts (in Spain) while the regulation
for workers with permanent contracts hardly changed. To have a more accurate measure of
legal protection against dismissals, we construct a new index denoted by EPLadjit in country
i at time t by adjusting EPLit for regular workers with the share share
perm
it of permanent
workers in the economy, i.e., EPLadj = EPLit × sharepermit . Source for sharepermit : OECD
Labour Market Statistics database. Data coverage: 1985-2007 (1990-2007 for KOR).
• The generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme, rit in country i at time t, is commonly
captured by the unemployment benefit replacement rate. It is worthwhile noticing
that the unemployment benefit rates are very similar across counties when considering short-
term unemployment (less than one year) but display considerable heterogeneity for long-term
unemployment. To have a more accurate measure of the generosity of the unemployment
benefit scheme, we calculate r as the average of the net unemployment benefit (including
social assistance and housing benefit) replacement rates for two earnings levels and three
family situations. Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database. Data coverage: 2001-2007.
In order to have longer time series, we calculated r over the period running from 1970 to
2000, by using the growth rate of the historic OECD measure of benefit entitlements which is
defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings
levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment. Source: OECD, Benefits
and Wages Database. Data coverage: 1970-2001 for all countries while data are unavailable
for Korea.
• The worker bargaining power is measured by the collective bargaining coverage, BargCovit,
which corresponds to the employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreements as a
proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining. Source:
Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention
and Social Pacts, 1960-2010 (ICTWSS), version 3.0, Jelle Visser [2009]. Data coverage: 1970-
2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU, DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA, 1970-2005
for NLD and NOR, 1970-2002 for BEL and FRA, 1977-2004 for ESP and 2002-2006 for KOR.
Summary statistics of the labor market regulation indicators used in the empirical analysis are
displayed in Table 11.
A.3 Calibration of the Labor Market
To calibrate the labor market for the traded and the non traded sector, we need to estimate the job
finding and the job destruction rate for each sector. To do so, we apply the methodology developed
by Shimer [2012] who assume that the labor force is fixed. Applying the same logic to our two-sector
model, we need to impose that the labor force F j is fixed at a sectoral level. The implication of
such an assumption is twofold. First, we explicitly assume that there are no movements into and
out of the labor force. Second, we assume that there are no movements between the traded and
the non traded sectors. Reassuringly, Shimer [2012] shows that a two-state model where workers
simply transition between employment and unemployment, shows that a two-state model does a
good job of capturing unemployment fluctuations. Because the reallocation of labor across sectors
is relatively low, the second assumption should not substantially affect the results.
The presentation below borrows heavily from Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin [2013]. We assume that
during period t, all unemployed workers find a job according to a Poisson process with arrival rate
mj(t) = −ln (1−M j(t)) and all employed workers lose their job according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate sj(t) = −ln (1− Sj(t)). We refer to mj(t) and sj(t) as the job finding and job
destruction rates in sector j and to M j(t) and Sj(t) as the corresponding probabilities.
The evolution over time of the unemployed workers, which we denote by U j(t), can be written
as:
U˙ j(t) = sj(t)Lj(t)−mj(t)U j(t), (56)
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Table 11: Summary Statistics per Country
Countries Variables
pˆ ωˆ aˆT − aˆN r BargCov EPLadj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AUS 0.91 -0.27 1.83 0.50 0.71 1.21
AUT 1.97 -0.72 2.89 0.50 0.97 2.48
BEL 2.26 -0.04 2.53 0.67 0.94 1.65
CAN 0.54 -0.42 1.55 0.54 0.36 0.81
DEU 0.85 -0.62 1.62 0.72 0.69 2.36
DNK 0.78 -0.91 2.21 0.61 0.82 1.93
ESP 2.62 -0.97 3.67 0.41 0.76 2.04
FIN 2.56 -0.78 4.22 0.59 0.86 2.02
FRA 2.14 -0.98 2.68 0.47 0.85 2.11
GBR 1.57 -0.50 2.31 0.63 0.45 1.02
IRL 2.55 -0.88 4.37 0.54 0.58 1.32
ITA 2.02 -0.92 3.05 0.08 0.83 2.53
JPN 2.60 -0.44 2.68 0.51 0.24 1.49
KOR 3.35 -2.15 6.49 0.38 0.11 1.98
NLD 1.86 -0.39 2.38 0.67 0.85 2.60
NOR -0.37 -0.39 1.96 0.43 0.70 2.06
SWE 2.34 -0.11 2.76 0.48 0.89 2.31
USA 1.74 -0.23 2.64 0.26 0.20 0.24
Average 1.74 -0.23 2.64 0.26 0.20 0.24
Notes: pˆ is the relative price of non tradables average growth rate, ωˆ is the
relative wage of non tradables average growth rate and (aˆT − aˆN ) is the
average growth rate of the labor productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables. Data coverage for pˆ, ωˆ and (aˆT − aˆN ) is 1970-2007
(1974-2007 for Japan). r is the unemployment benefit replacement rate.
Data coverage: 1970-2000 (2001-2007 for KOR). BargCov is the collective
bargaining coverage. Data coverage: 1970-2007 for AUS, AUT, CAN, DEU,
DNK, FIN, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA, 1970-2005 for NLD and
NOR, 1970-2002 for BEL and FRA, 1977-2004 for ESP and 2002-2006 for
KOR. EPLadj is the employment protection legislation index adjusted with
the share of permanent workers in the economy. Data coverage: 1985-2007
(1990-2007 for KOR).
or alternatively by using the fact that Lj(t) = F j − U j(t)
U˙ j(t) = sj(t)
(
F j − U j(t))−mj(t)U j(t), (57)
where sj(t) is the monthly rate of inflow into unemployment, mj(t) is the monthly outflow rate from
unemployment, and t indexes months.
Collecting terms, assuming that the job destruction rate and the job finding rate are constant
within years and solving eq. (57), pre-multiplying by e−(m+s)τ , and integrating over the time interval
[t− 12, t], leads to the temporal path for unemployed workers:
U j(t) = ψj(t)u˜j(t)F j(t) + (1− ψ(t))U j(t− 12), (58)
where u˜j is the long-run unemployment rate in sector j:
u˜j(t) =
sj(t)
sj(t) +mj(t)
, (59)
and ψj is the annual rate of convergence to the long-run sectoral unemployment rate:
ψj(t) = 1− e−(sj(t)+mj(t))12. (60)
To infer the monthly outflow probabilityM j(t) and then the monthly job finding rate mj(t), we
follow Shimer [2012] and write the dynamic equations of sectoral unemployment and sectoral short
term unemployment, i.e.,
U˙ j(t+ d) = sj(t)Lj(t)−mj(t)U j(t), , (61a)
U˙ j,<d(t+ d) = sj(t)Lj(t)−mj(t)U j,<d(t), (61b)
where Lj(t) is employment is sector j and U j,<d denotes short-term unemployment, i.e., the stock
of unemployed workers who are employed at some time τ ∈]t, t+ d] but lose their job and thus are
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unemployed at time t + τ ; hence, by construction, U j,<d(t) = 0 since all short-term unemployed
workers were employed at time t. Combining (61a) and (61b) to eliminate sj(t)Lj(t) leads to a
dynamic equation relating changes of unemployment to changes of short-term unemployment:
U˙ j(t+ d) = U˙ j,d(t+ d)−mj(t) (U j(t)− U j,<d(t)) . (62)
Solving eq. (62) above by integrating over [t − d, t], and using the fact that at time t, short-term
unemployment is such that U j,<d(t) = 0 leads to:
U j(t+ d) = U j,<d(t+ d) + em
j(t) .dU j(t).
Inserting e−m
j(t) .d =
(
1−M j,<d(t)) where M j,<d is the probability that an unemployed worker
exits unemployment within d months, one obtains:
U j(t+ d)− U j(t) = U j,d(t+ d)−M j,<d(t)U j(t) (63)
Eq. (63) states that the change of unemployment in sector j is equal to the inflows into unemploy-
ment U j,d(t + d) of workers who were employed at time t but are unemployed at time t + d less
the number of unemployed workers who find a job M j,<d(t)U j(t). Solving (63) for M j,<d(t), it is
possible to write the probability that an unemployed worker exits unemployment within d months
as
M j,<d(t) = 1−
[
U j(t+ d)− U j,d(t+ d)
U j(t)
]
. (64)
The probability of finding a job within d months given by eq. (64) can be mapped as the monthly
job finding rate for unemployment duration d = 1, 3, 6, 12:
mj,<d(t) = −1
d
ln
(
1−M j,<d(t)) . (65)
Data are available on annual basis to compute series for sectoral unemployment U j(t); setting d = 12
into eq. (64) leads to the probability of
M j,<12(t) = 1−
[
U j(t+ 12)− U j,<12(t+ 12)
U j(t)
]
. (66)
To estimate the monthly job finding rate mj,<12(t), we use data from the Labor Force Statistics
Database provided by the OECD. This dataset contains data on the share of the five durations of
unemployment among total unemployment: less than 1 month, > 1 month and < 3 months,> 3
months and< 6 months,> 6 months and< 1 year, 1 year and over. Define the number of unemployed
persons that has been unemployed in month t for less than a month as U1(t), more than one but
less than three months as U3(t), more than three but less than six months as U6(t), more than six
but less than twelve months U12(t), and more than 12 months as U∞(t). For clarity purposes, we
remove the superscript j and will introduce it again when necessary. The mapping of the definition
of short-term unemployment into the data implies U<12(t) = U1(t) + U3(t) + U6(t) + U12(t). Using
the fact that U(t) = U<12(t) + U∞(t), eq. (66) can be rewritten as follows:
1−M j,<12(t) = U
j
∞(t)
U j(t− 12) , (67)
where U∞(t) corresponds to unemployed workers in month t for more than 12 months. Applying
the same logic as before (see eq. (65)) and setting d = 12, the monthly job finding rate is:
mj,<12(t) = − ln
(
U j∞(t)
)− ln (U j(t− 12))
12
. (68)
Since series for unemployment by duration are expressed in percentage, we define ω∞(t) the share
of unemployment for 1 year and over among total unemployment as follows:
ω∞(t) =
U∞(t)
U(t)
. (69)
Since this share is not available by economic activity, we assume that ω∞(t) is identical across
sectors.
ω∞(t) = ωT∞(t) = ω
N
∞(t) (70)
An alternative way to estimate the monthly job finding rate is to use the duration of unemploy-
ment lower than one month. In this configuration, the probability of finding a job can be rewritten
as follows:
M j,<1(t) = 1−
[
U j(t)− U j,1(t)
U j(t− 1)
]
6
or alternatively by using the definition of unemployment by duration:
1−M j,<1(t) = U
j
3 (t) + U
j
6 (t) + U
j
12(t) + U
j
∞(t)
U j(t− 1) . (71)
Since U j(t−1) corresponds to monthly unemployment, we have to convert annual data on a monthly
basis:
U j(t− 1) = (U j(t− 12))1/12 (U j(t))11/12 . (72)
The monthly job finding rate is:
mj,<1(t) = − ln
(
U j3 (t) + U
j
6 (t) + U
j
12(t) + U
j
∞(t)
)
− ln (U j(t− 1)) (73)
where the construction of U j(t− 1) is given by eq. (72). The job destruction rate can be estimated
by solving this equation:
U j(t) = ψj(t)
sj(t)
sj(t) +mj,<1(t)
(
U j(t) + Lj(t)
)
+ (1− ψ(t))U j(t− 1), (74)
where U j(t − 1) is given by eq. (72) and ψj is the monthly rate of convergence to the long-run
sectoral unemployment rate:
ψj(t) = 1− e−(sj(t)+mj(t)). (75)
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